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ABSTRACT 
This thesis looks at how the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) was able to survive and control significant parts of Colombia until 
relatively recently. It also explains the decline of the FARC as a significant 
insurgency (and as one of the last, if not the last significant guerrilla organization 
in the region). While a historical political economy and social analysis of the rise 
and demise of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) 
between 1964 and 2010 tells us a great deal about the modern nation-state of 
Colombia, we also ask what the history and contemporary character of Colombia 
tells us about the rise and fall of the FARC?. More specifically, what are the 
future prospects for the FARC? Are the guerrillas gone? Furthermore, what are 
the implications of the decline of the FARC for Colombian politics? Finally, what 
are the Counterinsurgency (COIN) and other policy lessons, for Colombia and 
beyond, which we can derive from a thorough assessment of the rise and 
apparent demise of the FARC as a major guerrilla organization? We conclude 
that the dramatic weakening of the FARC in Colombia is part of a wider trend in 
the region. Despite the continued presence of social inequality and uneven 
economic development, the general opening of the political process in Colombia 
and elsewhere combined with the success of various counterinsurgency 
campaigns and/or the self-destruction of some insurgencies marks the dawn of a 
new era. Colombia is ultimately an example of the fact that major insurgency and 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis examines how the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) was able to survive and control significant parts of Colombia until 
relatively recently. It also explains the decline of the FARC as a significant 
insurgency (and as one of the last, if not the last significant guerrilla organization 
in the region). While a historical political economy and social analysis of the rise 
and demise of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) 
between 1964 and 2010 tells us a great deal about the modern nation-state of 
Colombia, we also ask what the history and contemporary character of Colombia 
tells us about the rise and fall of the FARC?. More specifically, what are the 
future prospects for the FARC? Are the guerrillas gone? Furthermore, what are 
the implications of the decline of the FARC for Colombian politics? Finally, what 
are the Counterinsurgency (COIN) and other policy lessons, for Colombia and 
beyond, which we can derive from a thorough assessment of the rise and 
apparent demise of the FARC as a major guerrilla organization? We conclude 
that the dramatic weakening of the FARC in Colombia is part of a wider trend in 
the region. Despite the continued presence of social inequality and uneven 
economic development, the general opening of the political process in Colombia 
and elsewhere combined with the success of various counterinsurgency 
campaigns and/or the self-destruction of some insurgencies marks the dawn of a 
new era. Colombia is ultimately an example of the fact that major insurgency and 
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Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the insurgency led by the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, known by their acronym as FARC) appears to have finally 
lost in its struggle against the Colombian government. Recent events have 
demonstrated that the FARC is now a marginal and irrelevant political and 
military force. To the surprise of its supporters and its opponents, the FARC is 
clearly a shell of what it had been at the start of the 21st century. It no longer 
represents a serious threat to the State of Colombia. That said, the FARC could 
still pose a threat to the citizenry of Colombia if the government does not address 
the social and economic problems that gave rise to the organization in the first 
place. Despite the continued presence of social inequality and uneven economic 
development, the general opening of the political process in Colombia and the 
demise of the FARC represents an opportunity to bring an end to insurgency as 
we knew it in Colombia and across the region. This work will examine the history 
of the rise and fall of the FARC and its interaction with the Colombian state over 
the years, and make recommendations to further limit, or eliminate, the type of 
threat that the FARC posed to Colombia between the 1960s and the early 21st 
century. 
Elsewhere in Latin America, Marxist inspired insurgencies disappeared or 
dwindled to relative insignificance, or reinvented themselves as more or less non-
violent social and political movements, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico, within 
the first decade after the end of the Cold War. To begin we seek to understand 
why the FARC did not follow this same trend until very recently. As part of this 
effort, Chapter II provides a historical account of the origins of the FARC and its 
initial interactions with the state. The FARC, originated out of the self-defense 
organizations that emerged in the 1950s, in large part due to the period known as 
La Violencia from 1948 to 1958 (although such organizations predated the 
1940s). In 1964, its leadership formally established it as a Marxist revolutionary 
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guerrilla organization. At the same time, the FARC’s ability to mobilize the 
population remained limited until the 1980s, as Figure 1 demonstrates. It is 
generally accepted that the primary reason the FARC was able to sustain itself 
from the 1960s onwards was because of the exclusionary power sharing 
arrangement (known as the National Front) developed between the country’s two 
elite political parties down to the 1980s. This arrangement ensured that the 
FARC leadership was able to position itself in opposition to the monopoly on 
political power by the country’s elite. While the FARC represented a challenge to 
the state, it never gained sufficient support or obtained the necessary resources 
to overthrow the government at any point during this period, despite an, at times, 












































































Figure 1.   FARC Membership 1964–2006 
(*From: Colombian Army Intelligence Estimate) 
The third chapter examines the various refinements in the FARC’s 
mobilization efforts and looks at how the strengthening of its resource base 
ensured that by the 1980s the Colombian state had begun to reevaluate the 
threat the organization represented. The Colombian state toyed with two different 
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strategies (moving back and forth between peace negotiations and bringing the 
FARC into the political process on the one hand and conducting major military 
operations against the organization on the other hand) to deal with the guerrillas. 
It is clear that by the 1980s the inconsistent policies pursued by the Colombian 
state, as reflected in the various peace processes, reinforced by the FARC’s 
growing military capability created the conditions necessary for the consolidation 
of the guerrilla organization’s power and reach as the Cold War came to an end 
(Figure 1).  
During the 1990s, the FARC expanded its presence in territorial terms, 
and the number of internal units (“fronts”) increased at a rate that almost pushed 
Colombia to the tipping point. Chapter IV demonstrates that this expansion was 
made possible in significant measure because the Colombian and U.S. 
governments were too focused on the issue of illicit drugs (cocaine). In fact, the 
growth and expansion of the cocaine trade created conditions that financed the 
further expansion and relative independence of the FARC in the context of the 
continued and growing significance of the cocaine trade for the Colombian 
economy as a whole. Colombian peace negotiations in the 1990s were futile and 
counterproductive because the FARC was for the first time in a position of 
relative power and had nothing to gain from a negotiated settlement.  
The Colombian Presidential election of 2002, meanwhile, proved to be a 
pivotal event for Colombia. It ushered in a new era in relation the FARC’s forty-
year insurgency and the violent conflict that has plagued Colombian history. As 
Figure 1 demonstrates, 2002 marked the end of the FARC’s growth as a political 
and military force. Chapter V outlines how this historic event changed the 
established pattern of interaction that had developed between the Colombian 
State and the FARC. Also examined is the nexus between the insurgency and 
the illicit drug trade, which has proven to be a double edge sword for the FARC. 
While the illicit drug trade provided the resource independence that enabled them 
to break away from the pattern followed by other insurgent groups in Latin 
America, it also provided a strong strategic framing tool for the Colombian state 
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in its battle against the FARC. Some of the challenges that remain and, under the 
right set of circumstance, could slow or even reverse recent trends in relation to 
the loss of power and capability by the FARC are also discussed in Chapter V.  
Some writers argue that the FARC is 'gone' and will only 'come back' if 
Colombian politics are so badly mismanaged as to allow for a renewed 
insurgency. As elsewhere in the region, it is unlikely that Colombian politics will 
again provide fertile ground for guerrilla insurgencies. Both in Colombia and 
across region, the political systems are now more open and social movements 
and neo-populist political parties have more or less completely displaced the 
major guerrilla insurgencies of an earlier era. The guerrillas that do exist are the 
exceptions that prove the rule. This may be the case both in broad terms across 
the region and in relation to Colombia specifically; however, it is too soon to 
assume that the “guerrillas are gone” for good in Colombia. The right set of 
circumstances could provide the setting for the renovation of the FARC’s 
organizational capacities. This coupled with the resource independence that this 
group achieved through illicit drugs, kidnapping, extortion, and other criminal 
activities suggests that if the underlying social and economic problems are not 
addressed the FARC may be more or less gone, but not forgotten. As of late 
2009, the Colombian government needs to further reduce what remains of the 
FARC’s organizational capabilities and redirect any remaining support the 
guerrillas have among the Colombian population. To this end, our concluding 
chapter summarizes our overall findings and provides recommendations to 
ensure that the FARC or similar guerrilla organizations disappear from the 




II. COLOMBIA HISTORY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
FARC 
Violent conflict has repeatedly engulfed Colombia since its emergence as 
an independent republic in the early nineteenth century. The reasons for this 
violence have varied from social conflict over the possession of land to labor 
disputes associated with industrialization and commercialization. There are also 
a host of other issues related to the government’s inability to monopolize force 
and effectively control Colombian territory in a fashion commensurate with the 
ideal, if not the practice of a sovereign nation-state. Despite the different 
manifestations of violence over time, the roots of the violence lie to a significant 
degree in the rivalry between the two main political parties, the Conservatives 
and Liberals, which have dominated Colombian politics since independence. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief history of political violence 
in Colombia from the nineteenth century to the early 1960s, which helps explain 
the eventual emergence of the FARC and the formation and character of the 
Colombian state. We will examine seven major historical episodes, all of which 
provide important insights into the origins of the FARC and all of which still have 
relevance today, even as it appears that the FARC is departing the Colombian 
political stage. These major episodes were the establishment of the new republic 
in Colombia (1810–1819); the establishment and rise of the Traditional Political 
Parties (1848–1849); the war of a thousand days and the loss of Panama (1899–
1902); the massacre of the United Fruit Company’s workers (1928); the violence 
between 1948 and 1958 precipitated by the assassination of the Liberal leader 
Jorge Eliecer Gaitán; the military government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
(1953–1957) and the era of National Front “Frente Nacional” (1958–1974). It was 
during the latter period that the FARC came into existence as a guerrilla 
organization.  
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A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW REPUBLIC IN COLOMBIA 
The emancipation from Spain occurred in Colombia between 1810 and 
1819. On 20 July 1810 in Santa fé de Bogotá, a group of native Colombians, 
asked for the loan of a vase from the Spaniard Jose Gonzalez Llorente. 
Gonzalez Llorente refused to loan the vase. The Creoles in turn broke the vase 
to provoke the Spanish. The latter reacted in a repressive fashion, providing the 
Creoles with the justification they wanted to call for rebellion against Spanish 
rule. During the ensuing struggle for independence, two competing ideological 
currents arose: federalism and centralism. A military confrontation between the 
proponents of federalism and centralism in 1814 allowed the Spanish 
commander on the ground, Pablo Morillo to retake control of the territory it had 
lost. These events served to radicalize the independent movement and gave rise 
to the liberation campaign commanded by Simon Bolívar. On 7 August 1819 at 
the “Battle of Boyacá” Bolivar led the Creole forces to victory and won definitive 
independence from Spain. Apart from Bolivar’s political and military leadership, 
the writings of other Creole intellectuals espoused republican ideas, the 
principles of freedom and equality and independence from Spain. Among them 
were Antonio Nariño, Francisco Miranda and Camilo Torres. With the victory 
against Spain, Simon Bolivar was declared president of the Republic of Gran 
Colombia and Francisco de Paula Santander, who fought actively in the 
campaign, was appointed vice-president. Between 1819 and 1830, Bolivar 
established Gran Colombia out of former Spanish administrative units centered 
on but not exclusive to the Viceroyalty of New Granada, while also reaching 
southwards into the Viceroyalty of Peru. Gran Colombia at its height 
encompassed, at least on paper, the five modern day nation-states of Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. In 1830, Simon Bolívar resigned the 
presidency because of illness, and died shortly thereafter. With his death, the 
dream of Gran Colombia also passed into history, breaking into the smaller 
republics that have survived down to the present. 
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B. ORIGIN OF THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN COLOMBIA  
By the middle of nineteenth century, the struggle for political power in the 
independent republic of Colombia was primarily an ongoing rivalry between two 
political parties. The Liberal party first appeared in 1848 headed by Ezequiel 
Rojas. A year later Jose Eusebio Caro and Mariano Ospina Rodriguez 
established the Conservative party. The second half of century represented a 
major break with the colonial socioeconomic structure. In particular, the 
Constitution of Rionegro (1863–1886) represents the triumph of the Liberals and 
their supporters and the political consolidation of individual liberties. While, these 
principles lead to a reframing of the ideological bases of the State, the 
Conservatives eventually gained ascendancy and consolidated a protectionist 
economic system with the Constitution of 1886. The latter lasted for more than 
100 years and included a rigid commitment to centralized government and ample 
executive authority. The Constitution established the suffrage for all the men; 
women would not receive this right until 1957. 
C. WAR OF A THOUSAND DAYS AND THE LOSS OF PANAMA  
The civil war of a thousand days took place from 1899 to 1902 (De La 
Pedraja Tomán, 2006). The causes of this war are rooted in the instability of the 
nineteenth century, particularly the incessant competition between the 
Conservative and Liberal parties. The conflict started as a form of protest against 
Conservative President Manuel Antonio Sanclemente. More specifically the 
Liberal party claimed that the 1886 Constitution was too centralized. In their view, 
it did not take into account the 1863 Constitution that had called for a series of 
cultural and socioeconomic reforms that decentralized the power of the national 
government. The violence that sprang out of this disagreement between the 
Conservative and Liberal parties spread throughout Colombian territory with the 
exception of the departments of Antioquia, Santander and Panama: the latter 
was still part of Colombia at this time (Simons, 2004). 
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During the War of a Thousand Days, the Liberal and Conservative parties 
both divided into distinct sub-factions. The Conservative party split into the 
Historical Conservatives and the National Conservatives, which led to the ouster 
of President Sanclemente, on July 29, 1901, and his replacement by another 
Conservative, President José Manuel Marroquín. This action resolved some of 
the major differences between the two Conservative factions and a more united 
Conservative party emerged. The Liberal parties factional divisions, by contrast 
remained deep and weakened their military capacity in the civil war. The Liberals 
continued to suffer a number of military defeats at the hands of the 
Conservatives, until General Rafael Uribe surrendered and signed a treaty to end 
the war in October 1902 (Oquist, 1980). 
While Colombia’s two dominant political parties were preoccupied with the 
War of a Thousand Days, the Department of Panama proclaimed its 
independence with the support of the United States. In fact, the separation of 
Panama from Colombia warrants further examination. Significantly, in 1878, the 
Colombian government had signed a contract with a French company to build an 
inter-oceanic canal in Panama. Two decades later, with the canal unfinished, the 
French company went bankrupt, and the work was suspended. The original 
French company was liquidated in 1899, and then a new French corporation was 
created to sign a new contract with the Colombian government to complete the 
canal. While all this was happening, the United States government was 
becoming more interested in the waterway through Panama. Earlier the U.S. 
government had looked favorably on a private American initiative to build a canal 
across Nicaraguan territory, a venture that never got past the planning stage. 
With the failure of the French company in Panama in 1899, the U.S. saw an 
opportunity to gain control over an increasingly important strategic and 
commercial canal the construction of which had already begun. Moreover, the 
Panamanian independence movement nicely coincided with the expansionist 
policies of the United States. Washington thought that this newly independent 
government would be more willing to accept the U.S. control of such an essential 
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waterway alongside its territory. Meanwhile, the U.S. government soon found that 
the French company and the Colombian government were open to negotiations. 
Colombia undertook to sell to the United States the strip of land where the 
French had initiated the construction of the canal. Representatives of the U.S. 
and Colombian governments signed the Herran-Hay Treaty in 1903. It was later 
approved the U.S. Congress; however, the Colombian Senate never accepted it 
(Miner, 1966; 1940).  
Prior to these events Panama had tried to secede from Colombia at least 
four times over the course of the nineteenth century: in 1830 and then in 1831; 
again in 1840 and then in 1860. However, it was not until November 3 1903 that 
the events surrounding the transfer of control of the Canal Zone from the French 
to the United States provided an opportunity for a group of people interested in 
Panama's independence to consolidate their power and proclaim the 
independence of Panama. The U.S., despite its recent treaty with Colombia, 
used its naval and military power to prevent the landing of Colombian forces in 
Panama to quell the independence movement. The new government of Panama 
signed a treaty with the U.S. and gave it sovereignty over the Canal Zone. 
D. THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY’S WORKERS STRIKE OF 1928 
Meanwhile, the United Fruit Company (UFC)—a U.S.-based company—
set up operations in the Colombian banana-growing area of Magdalena in the 
early twentieth century. In November 1928, one of the trade unions of which a 
number of the UFC’s workers were members began a strike to press for the 
solution to some social problems. The UFC refused to negotiate with the trade 
union and rejected their demands that the company bring its operations in line 
with Colombian law. Among other things, the union wanted the UFC to provide 
compulsory group insurance for accidents in the work place, increase salaries by 
fifty percent, cease the use of company-operated commissaries and pay-
advance vouchers, switch to a weekly payment system, allow for collective 
bargaining and build more hospitals. The only item the UFC was willing to accept 
 10
was the provision of weekly pay. The UFC and the Colombian government 
regarded the rest of the demands as unacceptable and/or illegal. Serious 
demonstrations occurred in Cienaga Magdalena, where the workers blocked and 
sabotaged the railway, telegraph lines and roads (Bucheli, 2005). In response, on 
December 5, 1928, the Colombian government issued Decree No. 1, declared a 
state of siege in the area and appointed the Army General Carlos Cortés Vargas 
as the civil and military head of the region. General Cortés took charge quickly 
and on the same day ordered immediate to dissolution of "any meeting with more 
than three people" and threatened to shoot over the heads of any crowd if 
necessary. At 1:30 AM on December 6, after reading the decree and ordering the 
crowd to leave, General Cortés informed the protestors in Ciénaga Magdalena 
that they had five minutes to disperse or suffer the consequences. A slaughter 
followed (the number of people killed remains a matter of dispute), but within 
days Cortés had ended the strike. For Cortés Vargas, the strike in the banana-
growing area was a subversive act prompted by communist agitators and 
anarchists. An alternate theory provided by Vargas and Soto argues that the 
military’s extremely violent reaction was a response to the fact that some of the 
troops from the northern region were beginning to align themselves with the 
strikers, and military did not want to lose control. Finally, the crowds were 
threatening the lives of government staff and destroying both government and 
private property (Corté Vargas, Carlos 1979)  
The UFC strike was undoubtedly a complex affair. It is clear that the 
relatively new Communist Revolutionary Party (PCR) had links to some of the 
UFC workers. More broadly, the 1920s and 1930s saw an upsurge in the power 
of labor and socialist ideas and organizations. In the wake of the violent 
repression of the UFC strike, the Liberal l party came to power, with the aim of 
modernizing labor laws and the system of land ownership, along with a renewed 
emphasis on industrialization by the start of the Second World War (Call, 1995). 
Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) was established in 1924; In 
July 1930, it changed its name to the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) 
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(Rangel, 1998). As with other communist parties, the PCC wanted to take power 
via some form of political-military revolution. According to sociologist Eduardo 
Pizarro, the origins of the FARC are to be found, in part, in three stages of 
political development that get underway in the 1920s and 1930s (Pizarro, 2004). 
The first stage was the era of armed resistance, inspired by the Colombian 
Communist Party (PCC), in the form of peasant self-defense, and the emergence 
of the first guerrilla nuclei. The second stage was the conversion of these nuclei 
into agrarian movements and the subsequent revival of these nuclei as guerrilla 
movements. The last stage was the formation of "independent republics" at the 
beginnings of the “Frente Nacional” in the late 1950s and the appearance of the 
FARC in 1964. 
E. LA VIOLENCIA 1948 TO 1958 I: THE BOGOTAZO 1948–1953 
The decade (1948–1958) was one of the most violent periods in 
Colombian history, with heavy fighting between the supporters of the Liberals 
and the Conservatives. The spark that ignited “La Violencia” was the 
assassination of Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán on April 9, 1948 (Braun, 
1985). The disturbances that followed became known as the Bogotazo and 
concluded with a power sharing agreement between Liberals and Conservatives 
called the “Frente Nacional,” National Front (Henderson, 1985). Eliecer Gaitán, a 
liberal, progressive and populist leader had been expected to win the upcoming 
presidential election. His death precipitated a spontaneous popular uprising that 
led to a series of riots and a wave of looting and destruction in the capital of 
Colombia (Braun, Herbert, 1985). President Ospina Pérez (1946–1950) imposed 
a state of siege throughout the country. On November 7, 1949, in response to the 
chaos, the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) ordered its members and 
supporters to engage in mass self-defense of the zones in their strongholds in 
Tequendama Sumapaz, Lebanon, Tolima, and San Vicente de Chucuri. These 
regions had had a long tradition of agrarian conflict (Henderson, 1985). 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Party scheduled a general strike for November 27 1949, 
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by which time violence was widespread throughout the country. The PCC had 
installed its own self-defense groups in several regions of the country including 
Viota and southern Tolima, and Chaparral. In four years (1948–1952) Communist 
and Liberal nuclei grew and increased their territorial control. They distributed 
productive lands and established mechanisms that provided support for the 
armed branches of their organizations (Oquist, 1980). 
F. LA VIOLENCIA 1948 TO 1958 II: LIEUTENANT GENERAL GUSTAVO 
ROJAS PINILLA 1953–1957  
On June 13, 1953, in the face of widespread chaos, the Liberal and 
Conservative parties empowered Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, to 
restore order and establish peace. Rojas Pinilla promised an amnesty to 
guerrillas who would surrender their weapons. Between June and November 
l953 the majority of the guerrillas of Meta, Antioquia, and Santander laid down 
their arms. In 1954 pardons and amnesty were granted under Decree # 1823 and 
# 2062 (Lasso Vega, 2005). The PCC and its guerrillas were dominant in the 
departments of Cundinamarca, Tolima, Santander, Antioquia and Huila. They 
were suspicious of Rojas Pinilla’s amnesty and refused to surrender their 
weapons. Their response was to continue to grow, consolidate and capture 
territory through force. In turn, General Rojas Pinilla’s reaction was to launch 
military operations in the region of Villarica to try to eliminate the communist 
revolutionary forces (Ardila Galvis, 2000).  
In 1955, the significant increase in armed Communist guerrillas in the 
region of Villarrica, led to military operations by the national government in the 
region of Tolima and Sumapaz. According to General Rojas Panilla, it was 
mandatory for the government to take actions immediately because the situation 
was out of control and continued to worsen. The Communists in turn engaged in 
the organized mobilization of peasants to neutralize the military’s actions (Rojas, 
2002). After three years, the Communist Party leadership decided to organize the 
civilian population in to columns. These columns where then moved to remote 
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and forested areas. Their main objective was armed colonization of the region of 
El Pato (Caquetá) The Guayabero (Target), the High Sumapaz. Armed guerrillas, 
who killed or sent into exile the settlers who were already in these regions, 
accompanied the agrarian movements (Simons, 2004). 
Meanwhile, in 1957, General Rojas Pinilla decided to resign the 
presidency in favor of a military junta. There was an agreement between the 
leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties to ensure that the country would 
regain its status as a representative democracy. The heads of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties signed an agreement to guarantee the stability of the 
parties, through the establishment of a pact called the "National Front”..  
G. “FRENTE NACIONAL” (NATIONAL FRONT) 1958 TO 1974 
Through the “National Front” agreement, both parties agreed to support a 
single presidential candidate by alternating the office of the presidency every four 
years between the parties and sharing legislative power equally (Call, 1995). The 
"National Front" (1958–1974) was a non-aggression pact between the two main 
political parties to ensure equality in the allocation of positions and jobs in the 
government. The agreement sought to strengthen political institutions and 
provided political stability for sixteen years, but it also led to the decline of state 
control. There was a growing absence of civil and military authority in many 
places and this allowed guerrilla groups to grow in numbers and territory. This 
agreement also excluded third party political voices, so the ranks of the guerrillas 
attracted individuals and groups marginalized by the Liberal and Conservative 
monopoly of political power (Call, 1995). The Colombian presidents during the 
period of the National Front were: Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958–1962), 
Guillermo León Valencia (1962–1966), Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–1970) and 
Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974).  
The Communist influence during the 1960s added a different character to 
the internal Colombian conflict. Through force or choice during this time 
thousands of families left their lands and moved to rugged areas where many 
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armed groups were set up to govern communist enclaves. Of these communist 
groups the oldest, most active, and most effective was the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC). The National Liberation Army (ELN) also arose, 
inspired by the Cuban revolution, the ideas of Che Guevara and liberation 
theology (Katz, 2004). Although first established in 1964, the FARC did not take 
the name of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia until April 1966 
(Molano, 2000) at which time they decided to be more mobile and to go to other 
areas of the country. By their Second Guerrillera Conference, when they formally 
adopted the FARC as their name, the group had developed six new corps of 
guerrillas. They also agreed on the strategy of reactive defensive operations 
directed at long-term conflict with the ultimate goal being the seizure of state 
power (Pizarro Leongómez & Peñaranda, 1991). The Third Guerrillera 
Conference was in March 1969 (Molano, 2000) in the region of Guayabero. At 
this meeting they discussed the training of new cadres and also designated the 
Magdalena Medio as the fourth general region of the FARC (Mackenzie, 2007). 
The fourth Conference took place at El Pato, in April 1971 (Molano, 2000). At this 
meeting the leadership addressed new perspectives for increased personnel and 
the acquisition of weapons. They set up a new front in Urabá close to Panama. 
At this time, the FARC still only had approximately 780 men. The Fifth 
Conference took place in Meta, in September 1974 (Molano, 2000). After this fifth 
conference, the FARC continued to grow very slowly, with the support of the 
peasants who inhabited the land on which the national government had no 
presence. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The origins of the FARC cannot be separated from the political violence 
that affected Colombia in the forties and earlier. Colombia, like many Latin 
American countries, never experienced major international conflicts, but had 
been in an almost permanent state of civil unrest since independence. The 
country’s elite sought stability via the creation of the National Front, a power 
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sharing agreement negotiated in 1958 between Liberals and Conservatives that 
prevailed for the next 16 years. Meanwhile, self-defense groups, taking 
advantage of the absence of the government in some parts of the country 
created the zones known as "Independent Republics." By 1964, the FARC, along 
with other communist groups had emerged out of these regions and expanded 
their influence slowly over the next decade. The gradual rise of the FARC also 
involved the integration of students and middle-class intellectuals into an 
insurgent movement typical of the Cold War era. Its strategy reflected the 
revolutionary euphoria of the 1960s. At the same time, the FARC (as we have 
seen) also emerged out of the longer, complex and violent political history 
particular to nineteenth and twentieth century Colombia.  
 16
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 17
III. 1975–1991: THE GROWTH OF THE FARC THROUGH THE 
FIRST PEACE PROCESS 
The FARC, as we have seen, grew gradually from the mid-1960s to the 
mid-1970s. Then, in the early 1980s, as Lair & Sánchez (2004) make clear the 
number of "strategic disruptions" carried out by the FARC increased dramatically. 
The number and size of its various fronts grew in this period, along with a huge 
new financial capacity, which enabled expansion into areas of great strategic 
value. Similarly, the FARC increased its military capability and with it, important 
achievements in the military field against government military forces, where the 
FARC demonstrated a new more sophisticated attack capability (Pardo Rueda, 
2004). The FARC also managed to grow in cities through the "Bolivarian militias.” 
Finally, the FARC created new “columns" of highly mobile units capable of 
attacking and destroying military bases and defending strategic territories, as 
approved at its Eighth Conference in 1993 (Ferro & Uribe Ramón, 2002). This 
chapter will summarize an important period in the FARC’s development, in 
relation to President Belisario Betancourt’s Peace Process and subsequent 
rounds of peace negotiations (Bejarano, 1995) (Corporación Observatorio para la 
Paz, 1999) (Pardo Rueda, 1996) (Torres Diana, 2008).  
A. PRESIDENT BELISARIO BETANCURT’S PEACE PROCESS 
On August 7, 1982, Belisario Betancourt became president of the 
Republic, after an election campaign where the issue of peace was the main 
differentiating feature among the various contenders. After his inaugural 
ceremony, Betancourt invited the rebels to dialogue. The government was initially 
receptive to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the April 
19th Movement (M19), then the Liberation Popular Army (EPL). The National 
Liberation Army (ELN) meanwhile, rejected Betancourt’s proposal for peaceful 
dialogue, although this did not preclude them from government initiatives (Pardo 
Rueda, 1996). This was the context in which, on November 19, 1982, the 
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President approved law # 35, which established amnesty and issued standard 
rules to restore and preserve the peace. The document contained ten articles on 
granting general amnesty to the perpetrators, accomplices or supporters of acts 
constituting political crimes committed prior to the passing of the law. The 
amnesty meant freedom for most prisoners, from the EPL, ELN, FARC, M-19, 
PLA, and ADO (Pardo Rueda, 1996) (Torres Diana, 2008) (Villamarín Pulido, 
1992).  
At the same time, Belisario Betancourt organized a new peace 
commission, composed of thirty-six members from all sectors of the government. 
After that, the Commission contacted the FARC announced a communication 
"greater understanding", issued as Decree 240 of 1983, which named three 
persons to serve as links to the government, the peace commission and those 
who benefited from the amnesty. (Cornell, 2005) Corporación Observatorio para 
la Paz, 1999). On March 28, 1984, after more than a year of conversations 
between the FARC and the government, in the midst of a serious deterioration of 
public order, the Peace Commission and the FARC signed an agreement. The 
document highlighted eleven points including a cease-fire set to start on May 28 
1984, and the launching of the National Peace Commission designated by the 
president (Gaitán, 2002). In the most important section of the Agreements, the 
FARC expressed the wish to demobilize its military structure and begin its 
transition to a legal political movement; they created a political party named the 
Patriotic Union (UP.) (Echandía Castilla, 2006) (Matta Aldana, 2002) (Pardo 
Rueda, 2004). 
B. THE PATRIOTIC UNION (UP) 
The whole country believed and hoped for a political solution to the conflict 
with the signing of the ceasefire, truce and peace accord between the 
government and insurgent groups. The FARC founded a political movement 
named the Patriotic Union UP (Pataquiva García, 2009). The UP was involved in 
the 1986 elections. Of the UP candidates that ran for government office, six were 
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elected as senators, nine as representative in departmental assemblies, as well 
as 335 as councilors in 187 municipalities across the country. In the presidential 
election, the party received about 350,000 votes, at that time the most votes in 
the history of any leftist group in Colombia (Pataquiva García, 2009). The UP had 
become an efficient tool for the dissemination of regional interests and 
revolutionary principles, mass organization and territorial expansion especially in 
areas dedicated to the cultivation and processing of cocaine, the same areas 
where the UP won the majority of offices, in Putumayo, Nariño, Caquetá and 
Meta. On June 16, 1987, the FARC’s groups, called fronts of war XIV and XV, 
ambushed a company from a regular infantry battalion leaving twenty-six soldiers 
and one civilian murdered, so President Virgilio Barco declared the peace 
process broken in that region (Pardo Rueda, 1996). 
The UP candidate, Bernardo Jaramillo, was assassinated during the 1990 
presidential election campaign, as was the Liberal candidate Luis Carlos Galan 
and the candidate representing the Democratic Alliance M19, Carlos Pizarro 
Leongomez. This situation and the natural death of Jacobo Arenas, founder of 
the FARC, encouraged the FARC to embark on a major offensive operation 
against the government in the early 1990s (Guaraca & Matta Aldana, 1999) 
(Pizarro Leongómez, 2004) (Villamarín Pulido, 1992). During the first year of 
President Cesar Gaviria’s government (1990–1994), the FARC abandoned the 
peace process. Then, on May 15, 1991, the FARC and the government again 
began to talk peace. Meanwhile the FARC was part of the Simon Bolivar 
Guerrilla Coordinating (CGSB) organization created in 1987 with the intention of 
unifying all guerrilla movements in Colombia (Ferro & Uribe Ramón, 2002) 
(Guaraca & Matta Aldana, 1999) (Pataquiva García, 2009) (Villamarín Pulido, 
1996). 
C. THE SIMON BOLÍVAR GUERRILLA COORDINATING (CGSB) 
To set up the CGSB, the leaders of the FARC, M-19, EPL, ELN, PRT and 
the Quintin Lame held a meeting in La Uribe (Meta). To the government this 
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agreement among guerrilla groups was a problem because the government had 
to negotiate with the CGSB both as a coordinated group and individually. In 
October and November 1990, the FARC and the ELN launched their alliance. 
They made several attacks on military installations, killing soldiers and civilians 
(Pardo Rueda, 2004) (Ortiz, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Instituto de 
Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, & Fundación para la 
Investigación y la Cultura, 2004) (Ejercito Nacional de Colombia, 2009). The 
violent attacks of the CGSB encouraged President Cesar Gaviria to order 
members of the Colombian army to carry out "Operation Colombia" on "Casa 
Verde," where the Secretariat of the FARC had been located for more than 
twenty years (Guaraca & Matta Aldana, 1999) (Alape, 1994). This military 
operation eliminated any possibility of negotiation with the group, as a whole, 
although negotiations with the FARC would continue. 
Cesar Gaviria’s government had made further institutional progress to 
improve the government’s leadership, creating the office of National Security 
Counselor, and appointing a civilian, for first time in Colombia’s history, as 
Minister of Defense. Meanwhile, the government continued to carry out peace 
talks with the FARC. The latter demanded an area of the country without 
government presence or control, and twenty offices in the National Constitutional 
Assembly (ANC), while retaining their military capacity and the constant threat of 
attacks on the country’s electrical infrastructure. The government responded with 
the continued use force (Arenas et al., 1990) (Bejarano, 1995) (Corporación 
Observatorio para la Paz, 1999). Then, in 1991, after the promulgation of the 
new Colombian constitution, the government accepted attempts to negotiate in 
Caracas, Venezuela, and Tlaxcala, Mexico. 
D. THE PEACE DIALOGUES IN CARACAS AND TLAXCALA  
The talks in Caracas beginning on June 3, 1991 involved two rounds. In 
the first round, the topics addressed included the possibility of a ceasefire 
agreement between the CGSB and the Military Forces. This was to be a bilateral 
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cease-fire without preconditions and mechanisms for oversight by national or 
international levels. The government also proposed locating the guerrilla groups 
in restricted geographical areas, while emphasizing the need to negotiate the 
terms of integration into the country’s politics, and establishing the conditions for 
demobilization. The second round began after a temporary suspension, agreed 
on between the two parties, to allow consultation by the respective bargaining 
committees of the CGSB and the Government. (Pataquiva García, 2009). The 
dialogue in Caracas was again suspended, after an attack by the FARC against 
the liberal politician Aurelio Irragorri. Meanwhile, on March 10, 1992, after a five 
month hiatus, the negotiations in Tlaxcala, started again. The CGSB posed 
"twelve strategies to build” peace, which indicated its views on major national 
issues such as the implementation of a neoliberal economic policy, the 
exploitation of natural resources in the country, administrative corruption, and the 
militarization of national life and human rights. With the death of Senator Argerino 
Durán Quintero, kidnapped months before by the EPL, the government, on May 
4, 1992, again officially suspended the dialogues (Arenas et al., 1990). After, in a 
public statement, the parties expressed their intention of resuming the talks no 
later than October 31, 1992. 
E. CONCLUSIONS  
From its origins to 1980, the FARC's political goal was to implement a 
communist system in Colombia, through armed revolution. The takeover was to 
be the end of the armed struggle. Beginning in the 1980s, the FARC reworked its 
political strategy, exemplified by the creation of the UP. This process failed and 
the FARC attempted to return a primarily insurgent posture and to the search for 
regional territorial autonomy. President Belisario Betancourt (1982–1986) first 
initiated the peace process. He began the National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) as 
a response to more than thirty years of fighting between the regular forces of the 
state and the insurgents. A Peace Committee, the promise of a general amnesty, 
and reconstruction of areas ravaged by the conflict were the highlights of the 
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PNR. The upper classes (large business groups, traditional political and 
congressional conservatives) did not accept the concessions to the insurgents 
defended by Betancourt. The plan did not work in the end, but it did lead to the 
birth of the Patriotic Union UP, the political arm of the FARC and the country's 
third democratic force at that time. Despite setbacks, Betancourt’s successors, 
Virgilio Barco (1986–1990), and César Gaviria (1990–1994) continued to pursue 
peace and a political solution to the country’s violent insurgencies. The guerrilla 
groups; 19 April Movement M19, the Liberation Popular Army EPL, and the 
Revolutionary Party of the Workers PRT left their criminal ways, gave up their 
weapons to form the political party Democratic Alliance M19 ADM19, and the 
Armed Movement Quintin Lame MAQL became the Social Indigenous Alliance 
ASI. On May 15, 1991, meanwhile, an approach between the FARC and 
government began. As we have seen, at the time FARC was part of the Simon 
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating (CGSB) organization created in 1987 with the 
intention to unify all guerrilla movements with the insurgents in Colombia in order 
to have more options in military and political ways. By the end of this period 1980 
to 2000, (what some observers regard as the best twenty years in the history of 
the FARC) the guerrillas had 18,000 men under arms.  
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IV. 1992–2002: A TRANSITION TO A WAR OF MOVEMENT 
With Colombia’s new constitution of 1991, a peace deal with the M-19, 
President Gaviria’s successful operations against Pablo Escobar (1993), and the 
destruction of the Medellin Cartel (1993–94), many observers seemed to think 
that Colombia was on the verge of turning the tide in its efforts to find peace and 
stability. One of the main beneficiaries of political developments in the 1990s 
would be the FARC. With the election of President Ernesto Samper (1994–1998) 
and the ensuing political scandal, structural changes in the government set the 
stage for increased competition for resources among the country’s illegally armed 
groups. This, combined with the limited approach taken by the United States 
towards Colombia, and the reorganization of the illicit drug market, contributed to 
the FARC’s ability to transition to a war of movement against an underprepared 
Colombian security force. The election of President Pastrana (1998–2002) 
marked the return of political respectability for the government of Colombia. 
President Pastrana won the election primarily because of his endorsement of a 
policy that called for peace negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana fulfilled this 
mandate to conduct peace negotiations with the FARC, and went to 
extraordinary lengths to demonstrate that the Colombian government was 
sincere in this effort. Pastrana also seemed to have a strong understanding of 
the fact that the FARC would only negotiate from a position of strength. At the 
outset, this policy gave the Colombian security forces room to adjust to the new 
threat that the FARC posed, and allowed for the introduction of Plan Colombia in 
1999.  
A. DRUGS, MONEY, AND POLITICS—THE SAMPER ADMINISTRATION 
While engaged in a very close presidential campaign against Andres 
Pastrana, Ernesto Samper’s campaign received some much needed funding, 
which ultimately assisted him in gaining a slim victory, but would also 
permanently tarnish his reputation. A scandal broke out almost immediately after 
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the election. The legal case against key members of President Samper’s 
government became known as the, “Processo 8000 case and before it was over, 
Samper’s attorney general, defense minister, and campaign treasurer, along with 
several legislators were convicted of drug money-related crimes” (Crandall, 2001, 
p. 103). This case clearly limited President Samper’s ability to govern. The 
Samper administration’s ineffectiveness as Bagley argues was accentuated by a 
regional economic slowdown, Samper’s political style, poor economic policy 
decisions coupled with the aid decertification of Colombia by the U.S. that 
combined in Colombia experiencing, “…its worst economic recession in 70 
years…” (Bagley, 2001, p 21, 22). This scandal and the President’s 
ineffectiveness across a broad spectrum of issues, including the economy, 
clearly lessened the legitimacy of the government and strengthened the positions 
of the FARC.  
The U.S. government’s response to the election of Samper was to push 
his administration to step up the fight against drug trafficking cartels, support 
coca-spraying operations in the south, and replace the National Police 
commander General Octavio Vargas Silva. President Samper agreed to these 
demands, “Thus Samper’s “narcocompromised” presidency ended up, whether 
he liked it or not, being Washington’s reliable and predictable ally in the drug war” 
(Crandall, 2001, p. 104). The appointment of General Serrano as the new head 
of the police allowed the U.S. government to work directly with him in its fight 
against drugs, basically bypassing President Samper (Crandall, 2001, p. 104). 
But, the U.S. government was still frustrated with it lack of success in combating 
the Cali drug cartel, and in 1995, the Colombian government was decertified, 
although it was granted a national security wavier to continue to receive aid. In 
response, the Samper administration, “…sent three thousand soldiers on a drug 
lord mansion raid, successfully confiscating a multitude of computers and cellular 
telephones believed to be integral to the dictate’s communications network…..By 
August, six of these fugitives were behind bars, including the infamous Rodriquez 
Orejuela brothers” (Peceny and Durnan, 2006, pp. 105–106). Interestingly 
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enough, the Clinton administration still decertified Colombia from receiving all 
assistance because the Samper administration had not done enough to fight the 
drug problem. The U.S. dissatisfaction with the Samper administration was made 
public when President Samper became only the second democratically elected 
head of state to lose his U.S. visa (Peceny and Durnan, 2006, p. 105).  
Samper’s efforts to destroy the Cali cartel had additional unintended 
consequences for the growth of the resource base for the FARC. Peceny and 
Duran point out that: “The decapitation of the Cali cartel left a power vacuum 
soon filled by small-scale competitors…the drug industry’s increasingly 
diversified entrepreneurs without the capacity to import mass quantities of coca 
leaves….Thus the transformation of the drug business into an increasingly 
fragmented and small-scale industry made it substantially more vulnerable to 
taxation by the FARC (Thoumi 2003, 135–136)” (Peceny and Durnan, 2006, p. 
106). As Russell Crandall (2001) argues, “When this revenue is combined with 
the revenues from ’revolutionary taxes,’ kidnappings, and other illicit activities, it 
is clear that the guerrillas possessed a formidable war chest estimated up to 
US$500 million annually. This enabled the guerrillas dramatically to expand their 
influence throughout Colombia…in 1995 the figure had risen to 59.8 percent of 
municipalities and has continued to grow since” (Crandall, 2001, p.111). The 
FARC’s expanded connection to the drug trade because of this vacuum in power 
did not only include additional tax revenues. Alain Labrousse (2005) details how 
the FARC also during this time introduced poppy into areas of the country and 
eliminated middlemen (Labrousse, 2005, p. 178).  
With each rebuff by the U.S. administration, it seemed that Samper tried 
even harder to show that he was fighting drugs, even to include changing the 
Constitution so that drug leaders could be extradited to the United States. 
Samper also seemed to be willing to support the U.S. fumigation program; 
although, it was met with great concern among his populace, and may have 
actually contributed to the social base of the FARC. Ricardo Vargas Meza (1998) 
states, “In mid-1996, over 200,000 farmers and peasants from the coca-growing 
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regions of the country, located principally in the south, marched on their state 
capitals, protesting the fumigations and demanding viable economic alternatives 
to illicit crop cultivation. The magnitude of these peasant protests, combined with 
simultaneous guerrilla attacks on military bases in the neighboring 
departments…convinced authorities that the protests were an expression of the 
political and military strength of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC)” (Vargas, 1998, p.1). These extraordinary efforts taken by the Samper 
administration seemed to demonstrate it was willing to place Colombian interests 
below the U.S. priorities.  
The U.S. policy in Colombia during the Samper administration clearly had 
dramatic effects on Colombian domestic policy. However, it seems clear that 
many of the efforts undertaken by the U.S. myopic anti-drug focus did little to 
stop the drugs, and its policies may have actually contributed to the power and 
resources of the illicit drug problem being directed to a more dangerous foe than 
the cartels. The case of the U.S. strategy of aerial fumigation seems to have 
been one of the longest lasting continual failures. This policy began under the 
Andean Ridge initiative during the George H. Bush administration in 1989 
(Crandell, 2001, p. 101). Numerous studies have shown that these efforts have 
not lowered the amount of acreage used to cultivate illicit drugs, have not raised 
the prices or availability of these illicit drugs in the United States (Tickner, 2003, 
p. 2). The Clinton administration recommended a pull back on this strategy for 
these very reasons in 1992, but U.S. conservative domestic pressure not only 
reversed this decision, but also actually increased the resources devoted to this 
effort (Crandall, 2001, p. 101). Beyond the apparent ineffectiveness of the 
fumigation efforts in lowering the amount of drugs in the U.S., it also served to 
increase the popular appeal of the FARC. Richard Vargas Meza (1998) points 
out that the fact that many of the coca growers were able to stage mass protests 
in 1996 and boycott the elections of that year was a direct reaction to the U.S. led 
eradication efforts and ultimately, “…generates more support for the guerrillas” 
(Vargas, 1998, p. 4).  
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The resources dedicated to fight the problem were also almost solely 
devoted to the National Police (Tickner, 2003, p.4). This policy did seem to have 
aided the National Police in becoming a more professional and less corrupt force 
than many of its Latin American peers. This has been essential to establishing 
legitimacy of the government in the long run, but the timing of allocation of 
resources to the police may have been inappropriate when assessing the 
capabilities of FARC versus the capabilities and mission of the National Police. It 
seems likely that the military would have been a more appropriate force to 
combat the serious threat that the FARC had evolved to be. Critiques at the time 
were vehemently opposed to any strategy to support the military because of the 
military’s connections to the paramilitary groups (Bagley, 2001, p. 24 ). However, 
this thesis argues that allocating more training and resources to the military 
would have been instrumental in cutting the ties between the military and 
paramilitary groups. First, it could have provided resource- based incentives tied 
to compliance with human rights standards. Second, it could have provided the 
types of equipment and training that would have made the military force more 
effective, and in the process, less likely to need assistance from illegally armed 
groups. This is not to say that all ties between military and civilian actors can be 
eliminated because historically, during insurgencies, both police and military 
forces have relied on local security elements to provide intelligence and local 
security (Marks, 2003, p. 94). However, with increased military capability, the 
military’s relative strength would have made it the dominate actor in the 
relationship and it would have been able to curb the abuses if given the proper 
incentives.  
The 1991 Constitution  mandated a decentralization of resources available 
to the local level. According to Fabio Sanchez and Maria del Mar Palau(2006) in 
the their work Conflict, Decentralization and Local Governance in Colombia, 
1974–2004, the intent of this decentralization was, “…aimed at reducing poverty, 
increasing political participation and enlarging social service…” (Sanchez and del 
Mar Palau, 2006, p.13). Sanchez and Palau carried out a detailed quantitative 
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study of violence in Colombia and concluded that, “…on the one hand, local 
governments have less repressive capacity than the central government so local 
leaders are more susceptible to intimidation, and on the other, as more resources 
are transferred to local governments the ’pot’ available for plundering increases” 
(Sanchez and del Mar Palau, 2006, p. 13). They further determined that the 
illegally armed groups in Colombia, “…have redefined the strategic objectives of 
the illegal groups….and the decentralization process that turned the conflict into 
a dispute for local power” (Sanchez and del Mar Palau, 2006, p. 34). This 
hypothesis is particularly interesting in terms of the FARC because it assumes 
that the FARC had the original objective of destroying the state, but when the 
state changed, the FARC redefined their strategy. The FARC then found the goal 
of influencing local government more attainable. This argument fits interestingly 
with another unrelated argument by Roman Ortiz (2002) presented in the work 
Insurgent Strategies in the Post Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia where the author argues that the FARC’s success has been 
in part due to a flexibility when abandoning their Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and 
embracing a Bolivarian ideology. This is especially pertinent in that the group has 
“heightened the critique of the government’s incompetence in dealing with the 
country’s biggest problems (social inequality, crime, and deficient public 
services), while presenting themselves more and more as a credible alternative 
for the ’good government’…has gone from criticizing the legitimacy of the origin 
of the state to questioning its functional legitimacy” (Ortiz, 2002, p. 130). Ortiz 
then also identifies the FARC’s strategy, “…throughout the 1990s the FARC gave 
special importance to gaining a share of power at the municipal level within the 
state, where it is more visible in an administrative capacity” (Ortiz, 2002, p. 133). 
The constitutional changes clearly presented an opportunity to the FARC, and 
they have actively engaged in a strategy to compete for local resources and it 
can be assumed that this has further strengthened their position in terms of 
wealth and legitimacy.  
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The FARC’s connection to drugs is a subject of ongoing debate. Whether 
they are driven by greed or grievance is an interesting area of study. However, it 
is clear, no matter what its motives the FARC dramatically increased its 
connections to the illicit drug trade during the early 1990s (Tickner, 2003, p. 2). 
This increased connection to drugs as a source of revenue to fund military 
capability was first authorized during the 7th Conference of 1982 (Labrousse, 
2005, p. 177). But, as previously stated, the weakening of the drug cartels 
lessened competition in this area, and for the first time in the early 1990s the 
FARC revenues were substantially increased. The FARC’s realization of the 
potential profits led them to pursue many other forms of taxation, and further 
integration into other facets of the illicit drug industry to include airfield security 
and drug refinement (Ortiz,2002, p.137). The FARC’s vast increase in revenues 
was then used to field a larger force, and much of the profits were reinvested in 
the economy, both legal and illegal (Rangel,2000, p. 582). The connections 
made during the integration into the illicit drug world also served the FARC by 
granting them better access to the illicit weapons market, as well as additional 
training from criminal and terrorist groups like the IRA (Miller, 2002, p. 2). The 
FARC’s increased capacity in terms of personnel, training, and armament led 
them to the realization that they could now confront the military directly in battle. 
The decision to move to a war of movement was cited in the 8th Conference of 
1993 where they approved the formation and tactical implementation of mobile 
columns (Ferro & Uribe Ramón, 2002).  
The FARC’s tactical transition to a war of movement initially caught the 
security forces off guard. Both the military and the National Police in the early 
1990s were still using strategies and tactics that were oriented towards the 
FARC’s old strategy of guerilla warfare. The military’s first major loss was 
credited to an attack at Las Delicias in 1996, where an army base was overrun 
and over 60 soldiers were taken captive (Molano,2000, p. 4). The FARC’s 
strategy was a well-conceived strategy that they had borrowed from the 
Vietnamese and FLMN (Marks, 2003, p. 92). The FARC would conduct 
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numerous coordinated small scale guerrilla attacks across a broad area and 
then, when the security forces would react to these attacks, the FARC would 
mass forces on the real objective that was separate from those of the guerilla 
attacks. These tactics were used a number of times before the military realized 
that tactical patience was the key, and that it should wait until the enemy’s 
primary objective was identified before sending in reinforcements. The military 
then began a series of operations to deny the FARC mobility corridors, and this 
can be seen as the military’s first acceptance that the FARC was in a war of 
movement (Marks, 2003, p. 83).  
B. PLAN FOR PEACE WHILE PREPARING FOR WAR—THE PASTRANA 
ADMINISTRATION 
President Pastrana was swept into office in 1998 on a ticket that promised 
to conduct negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana took this mandate seriously and 
arrived at the negotiations prepared to see if peace could be negotiated. 
However, from the beginning, the FARC did not seem to be prepared or willing to 
negotiate peace. First, it seemed that the FARC were demonstrating that they 
were negotiating from a position of power by launching a large attack across the 
country during President Pastrana’s inauguration (Murillo, 1998, p. 1). The very 
first scheduled meeting found the President at the conference and the FARC’s 
leader Manuel Marulanda Velez (a.k.a Tirofijo) a “no show” (Villamizar, 2003, p. 
29). The FARC legitimately cited fear that the government could not control the 
paramilitary groups and guarantee their security. The experience from the U.P. in 
the 1980s still clearly was a legitimate obstacle to any negotiations. The 
paramilitaries groups, by this time, consolidated much of their power in the north 
of the country and were even more of a threat than in the 1980s.  
President Pastrana then took a large step to try to prove that the 
government was willing to work around the problem of security for the FARC by 
granting the FARC a security zone where no government operations would take 
place. This area became known as the “despeje” on November 7, 1998 (Shifter, 
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1999, p. 119). It was roughly the size of Switzerland and was located in the 
southern area of the country. The Pastrana administration also took a previously 
unprecedented action of allowing third parties to take part in the negotiations. 
Representative from the Catholic Church and representative from the U.N. were 
brought into the negotiations. The United States even conducted secret talks with 
the FARC on an alternative development for illicit crops (Bagley, 2001, p. 22). 
However, it became clear to many observers that the FARC were still in a 
position of strength and there was very little hope for a negotiated settlement of 
the conflict. The FARC’s actions during this time, including continued attacks and 
an expanding illicit drug industry in the “despeje,” seemed to show that the FARC 
were content with the status quo and would do nothing to change it (Forero, 
2002, p. 4). Some critics would also point out that one key aspect that the 
government did not address was, “Despite Pastrana’s demonstrable commitment 
to peace, Bogotá never mounted a sustained offensive against the 
paramilitaries…” and the paramilitaries tripled in size (Sweig, 2002, p. 4).  
“Plan Colombia” was the response that the Pastrana administration 
developed as it became apparent that peace talks were futile. In 1999, Pastrana 
began a sophisticated campaign to push for increased U.S. support, international 
support, and even called on the rich of Colombia to strengthen the security 
apparatus of Colombia under Plan Colombia.. The plan was very ambitious and 
its cost was to be around $7.5 billion U.S. dollars, with the U.S. providing $2 
billion, Colombia $4 billion and the international community $1.5 billion (Bagley, 
2001, p.23). The plan had a panacea of objectives—economic development, 
fighting corruption, and development of the security forces being the primary 
objectives. Pastrana was able to secure new taxes to meet the Colombian 
commitments and the U.S. was able to secure nearly all of the $2 billion. One 
very distinctive facet of the U.S. portion of the money was that for the first time 
military assistance took priority over police assistance (Sweig, 2002, p. 4). Most 
of the international funding for the plan was never secured and it seems that 
many of the development initiatives were limited because of this. Of the money 
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that was secured, the majority was directed to the development of the capabilities 
of the security forces. This led many critics to question the effectiveness of “Plan 
Colombia” (Peceny and Durnan, 2006, p. 110).  
It has also been argued that the FARC used the end of the peace process 
and the “despeje” to prepare for a final showdown with the government. Many 
observers point to the massive amounts of arms being smuggled in the area, “In 
mid-January 2000…the FARC acquired more than 20,000 East German assault 
rifles along with grenade launchers, mortars, SAM-12 surface-to-air missiles, 
sophisticated electronic communication equipment, and their own small but 
growing air force” (Bagley, 2001, p. 12). The FARC also used the zone as a base 
of operations to stage attacks throughout the country (Cala, 2000, p. 59). Their 
complete takeover of the illicit drug activities in the “despeje” from cultivation, to 
refinement, and transshipment also was identified as FARC’s opportunity to build 
a war chest of funds (Robinson,1999, p. 69). They attempted to gain international 
recognition and legitimacy during this time, but this effort was largely considered 
a failure when both the E.U. and Canada placed them on terrorist lists (Forero, 
2002, p. 4). 
The attacks on U.S. aid workers, the hijacking of a commercial airliner, 
and the kidnapping of a Colombian senator in late 2001 and early 2002 finally 
prompted the Pastarana administration to end the peace negotiations and begin 
a military campaign to rescuer the “Despeje” (Isacson, 2002, p. 1). In late 
February 2002, President Pastarana gave the rebels a 48-hour deadline to clear 
the zone and then began a military offensive to clear the area (Miller,2002). This 
offensive was backed by Washington and it seems that the U.S. had finally 
abandoned the counter-productive drug policy for a counterterrorism/ 
counterinsurgency policy (Isacson, 2002, p. 1). Sharing intelligence and providing 
additional training and resources proved this shift in strategy. The Colombian 
security forces relatively quickly secured a large portion of the “despeje” and 
limited the mobility corridors of the FARC (Marks, 2003). The military then began 
to conduct operations that focused on destroying rebel bases. The FARC were 
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unable to defend these areas and the tactics of the FARC slowly changed to 
smaller scale operations. The military effectiveness demonstrated that the FARC 
had misjudged their relative strength and the conditions that were necessary for 
a guerrilla movement to conduct a “War of Movement.”  
The Colombian people believed that the motives behind Pastrana’s 
actions were good, but many thought that he was too slow at recognizing the 
FARC’s true intentions. Many observers still feel that because the FARC had 
been granted this area for three years, they were able to grow to a level would 
make them a legitimate threat for generations. The FARC also recognized that 
the government was underprepared to deal with the displaced persons after the 
“despeje” was eliminated, compounding a problem that already made Colombia 
have the largest number of displaced citizens in the world(Bagley, 2001, p. 18). 
While the military enjoyed success during the campaign to retake the “despeje,” 
the government’s lack of a combined coordinated effort further damaged the 
government’s legitimacy in terms of providing good governance to the newly 
secured areas (Marks, 2003).  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
During President Samper’s administration, Colombian democracy reached 
a low point in terms of legitimacy. The “Processo 8000” case not only lessened 
the legitimacy of the government by connecting drug traffickers to the election, 
but more importantly, it seemed to plague the Samper administration’s ability to 
develop any type of independent policy to focus on Colombian priorities. With the 
election of President Pastrana, the Colombian democracy was able to begin to 
place Colombian interests as the priorities of its policy. President Pastrana’s 
entrance into the negotiation process with the FARC may be questioned when 
considering the FARC’s relative strength and maturity as an insurgent group. 
However, the policy of negotiating with the FARC can also be seen as a return of 
good governance because President Pastrana was elected on a national 
mandate from the people he hoped to govern calling for these negotiations. The 
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Pastrana administration’s development of “Plan Colombia” further demonstrated 
that Colombian priorities were being addressed. Plan Colombia addressed a 
myriad of Colombian problems which may have been its biggest weakness. If 
Plan Columbia it did not correct all of the problems, critics could point to its 
failures. However, it is clear that the Pastrana administration did have as a 
priority strengthening the security forces (primarily the military), so that the 
government could first secure the population. This prioritization seemed to be the 
true strength of Plan Colombia and set the conditions for the success of future 
administrations.  
U.S. policy during the Samper administration seemed to lack an 
understanding of the problems that illicit drugs presented to Colombian and U.S. 
interests. The elementary and very limited focus of implementing policies that 
were focused on reducing the production of illicit drugs may have actually been 
counterproductive in terms of fighting the drug problem and clearly did little to 
assess how these policies would affect power relationships within Colombia. It 
seems that these policies would not accept that without cutting the demand, the 
production of illicit drugs would continue. Clearly the U.S. could assisted in 
eliminating the power brokers that controlled the industry, but the power simply 
shifted to another dangerous foe. With the destruction of the Medellin and Cali 
Cartels, power over the illegal drug trade was then controlled by the FARC and 
the AUC. The U.S. concern for human rights abuses clearly did not benefit the 
empowerment of either the FARC or the AUC. The U.S. human rights concerns 
also led to the development of a policy of supporting only the national police. This 
policy would be beneficial in the long run, but the national police clearly were not 
and should not be the force to confront a mature guerrilla organization able to 
conduct a war of movement type operations. AU.S. policy that had not been so 
limited in its assessment of the capabilities and the threat that the FARC posed 




military. After the September 11 attacks, U.S. policy finally exhibited that it must 
increase support for the military under Plan Colombia as President Pastrana 
proposed.  
A myriad of developments during this time clearly benefited the FARC’s 
ability to obtain the resources necessary to train, equip, and field a force that was 
capable of confronting the Colombian security forces in traditional battles. The 
FARC demonstrated a considerable amount of competence in conducting these 
types of operations in conjunction with simultaneous guerrilla attacks. The FARC 
also demonstrated that they had the flexibility and discipline necessary to further 
integrate into the illicit drug business while still maintaining the focus of a 
traditional guerrilla organization. It would be a mistake to consider the FARC as 
solely drug criminals during this period, but it would also be foolish to consider 
them as a completely ideological organization. This debate continues to this day, 
but it is clear that this strategy has also exposed a potential weakness for the 
FARC. It has contributed to a negative image in the populace of Colombia and 
has helped justify the U.S. interests in combating the group. However, the most 
fatal mistake that the FARC may have committed during this time was moving to 
the war of movement stage of revolution before it should. Clearly, the FARC was 
well equipped and had effective fighters, but the disparity in strength between the 
FARC and government security forces may have actually increased during the 
time of the “despeje.”  
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V. 2002–2009—PRESIDENT URIBE AND SECURING THE 
NATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The institutions of national power and the strength of democracy in 
Colombia have undergone vast changes in recent years. These changes have 
been most prevalent in terms of increased opportunity for alternative groups to 
attain political success, the opening of a strategy that allows for peaceful 
resolution to Colombia’s conflict alongside the strengthening and development of 
the security forces. The illegally armed groups in Colombia, as a result, have 
experienced a major loss of relative power. The population as a whole has seen 
economic opportunities increase, and the people seem to have found an issue 
that inspires some national unity. While these changes all appear to bode well for 
the future of Colombia as a nation state, there have been many injustices 
associated with this process and certain forces still present a sustained threat to 
the nation of Colombia.  
B. POLITICAL SPACE 
The opening of the political space for voices outside of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties may be directly attributable to the 1991 peace arrangement 
and the revised constitution that it produced. According to a leader of the M-19 
movement who helped write the new constitution and became a successful 
senator, Antonio Navaro Wolff, “In the land of political pluralism the work of 1991 
also produced lasting changes. The bipartisanism has been closed and the 
exclusion of 140 years has disappeared. Today it is impossible to think of 
Colombian society without an amplitude of political parties, seemingly 
exaggerated at times. Colombia must better channel the exercise of the policy, 
but the time in which a handful of liberal and conservative heads handled their 
parties as a property will never return.” (Translation by the authors.) (Navarro, 
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2009). The effectiveness of the new constitution was proven in the 2002 
Presidential election of an independent candidate, Alvaro Uribe. From 1991 until 
2002, the sheer numbers and fragmentation of parties had allowed the traditional 
parties’ organizations to prevail and continue their domination of Colombian 
politics. While some 80 different parties were officially recognized, their individual 
successes had been limited to small numbers of congressional, provincial, and 
municipal victories (Moreno, 2004). The election of an independent candidate to 
the Presidency signaled the maturation of these 80 parties. Their ability to 
organize coalitions dramatically changed the course of Colombian politics. In so 
doing, these parties have forced all parties and groups to rethink politics.  
President Uribe seized on the discontent created by the traditional parties’ 
inability to improve the country’s security situation. Indeed, a common public 
belief was that, as Swieg contends, the Liberal and Conservatives seemed to 
conspire to keep the keep the military weak so that they could profit from the 
situation (Swieg, 2002), or as Vanessa Joan Gray contends, “that Colombian 
weak state capacity stems from stalemated intra elite conflict…”(Gray, 2008, p. 
77). Uribe put forward a simple plan to deal with the security issues that 
dominated the public’s attention. As Colonel Alberto Mejia suggests, “he offered 
a vision, a coherent plan and the necessary resources to save Colombia called 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSDP)” (Mejia, 2008, p. 9). The 
DSDP,”… focused on regaining control of areas close to large urban centers, 
highways and infrastructure” (International Crisis Group, 2009, p.21).  
In 2002–2003, security forces launched a series of offensives that pushed 
the FARC out of strategic locations in Cundinamarca and Antioquia departments 
(International Crisis Group, 2009, p.21). It must be acknowledged that a number 
of human rights violations during this campaign were later brought to light. 
Uribe’s plan called for a continuation of the Plan Colombia that his predecessor 
Pastrana had developed, but he took the increased military spending a step 
further by proposing taxes to increase the overall size of the military. This was a 
radical shift from Pastrana’s government, which had spent 1.35 percent of GDP 
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(Sweig, 2002), Uribe’s government spent 4.36 percent of GDP in 2003 (Defense 
Spending, 2009). Uribe’s DSDP was not limited to military and security force 
actions, but there can be no denial that they were the main effort in the first 
phase of the plan.  
The hard line that President Uribe offered was simply that only if an 
illegally armed group agreed to a unilateral cease fire and stopped illegal 
activities would the group then be able to start peace negotiations. This was a 
clear line drawn by President Uribe. The real point to this was that for the first 
time the debate had shifted from who was going to be in charge, to the issue of 
what should be done about the country’s critical security situation. Under Uribe’s 
model of the DSDP, the increased security would create, “a climate of confidence 
and stability that would attract private investment and economic growth. This 
economic recovery would guarantee better state revenues and would foster 
social investment” (Mejia, 2008, p.24), which Colonel Mejia claims were based 
on Uribe’s past experience as a Governor. This simple message resonated with 
the public and Uribe was able to organize a coalition of political parties that would 
become a new force in Colombian politics.  
Alvaro Uribe began his political career as a member of the liberal party, 
and the son of a land owning cattle rancher in the Antioquia Department of 
Colombia. As his resume states on the official web page of the Office of the 
Presidency of Colombia, he served as a Mayor of Medellin, Secretary General for 
the Labor Ministry, Director of Civil Aviation, a legislator from the area, and the 
Governor of Antioquia (Cirriculum Vitae, 2009). By official accounts, he was a 
very successful legislator and politician. But, the geography of President Uribe’s 
background seems to have proven to be one his largest liabilities that have 
promoted a number of accusations against his presidency: 
Uribe built his political career in Antioquia, one of Colombia's most 
populous, prosperous and violent departments, infamous as home 
of the Medellin drug cartel. As governor, his "efficient government" 
program focused on privatization of public services and on political 
reform. Uribe has long advocated more civilian participation in 
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military operations-plans that critics fear could strengthen the 
paramilitaries. During his tenure as governor, he was an 
enthusiastic supporter of rural security cooperatives known as 
Convivir. These groups essentially legalized the paramilitary activity 
that had been outlawed in 1989, allowing civilians to carry out 
armed patrolling and intelligence functions under the control of local 
military commanders. The Convivir were widely criticized by human 
rights groups for involving the civilian population in the conflict, 
committing abuses and working with established illegal paramilitary 
forces…. Uribe has also been accused of having had links with 
drug trafficking in the 1980s, accusations that he vigorously denies. 
He maintains that his connections to the infamous Ochoa drug 
trafficking family were limited to thoroughbred horse shows, a 
popular upper-class sport in Antioquia for which the Ochoas were 
famous. He also denies allegations that part of his campaign funds 
originated in Pablo Escobar's neighborhood development project, 
Medellin without Slums. (Tate, 2002) 
The accusations have never resulted in any legal action being taken 
against President Uribe, but they have undoubtedly colored his presidency in the 
eyes of many of his detractors. Even with these accusations, Uribe was able to 
break away from his traditional Liberal party and win the office of the Presidency 
in 2002, as an independent candidate, with a simple hard line plan to deal with 
the security issues of the nation. 
The success of Uribe’s plan, in terms of the implementation of the DSDP 
in the form of the military Plan Patriota,”a campaign to recapture FARC-held 
territory, began operations to secure the capital and environs of Bogotá from 
FARC attack. This phase was largely seen as successful, based on the decrease 
in kidnappings and roadblocks in the region” (Veillette, 2004, p. 12). With this 
beachhead of security obtained by the military, operations of Plan Colombia 
began to move to other area of the country including the traditional home base of 
the FARC. Between 2004–2006, the focus of the plan shifted to the south and 
east, but it seemed to stall around election time (International Crisis Group, 2008, 
p. 21). By this time, Uribe had developed a new coalition of supporters amongst 
the various independent parties. This coalition would become known as the 
Primero Colombia. The coalition’s organization and the popularity of President 
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Uribe resulted in both a Constitutional change to allow him to run for a second 
term and a landslide victory in the polls; however, the party soon lost steam and 
was reinvented as the party of the U shortly after the election (“Elecciones 2006,” 
2006).  
Uribe’s victory was in large part due to the improved security situation, but 
also due to the populist stance that Uribe had adopted which focused on bringing 
the government to the people. This is exemplified in President Uribe’s continual 
travel to all areas of the country to conduct town hall types of meetings called 
called “Consejos Comunitarios” where he listened and proposed solutions to the 
local problems (Latorre, 2003). This populist type of politics was a change in 
tactics and has proven to be effective against the traditional parties that were not 
accustomed to it and which often criticize Uribe for it. The aforementioned 
changes in style, the change in results in terms of security for the citizenry, and 
the success of an independent party that runs as a part of a coalition, all seemed 
to have truly marked a change in Colombian politics, opening the system in a 
manner that will make it hard for a return to the status quo. 
This is not to say that President Alvaro Uribe has solved all of Colombia’s 
problems. Colombian democracy is faced with many additional challenges. Also, 
a number of the challenges that face the country have been brought about 
through the actions of the current government. One of the most disturbing issues 
brought to light was the scandal involving members of the Departmento 
Administrivo de Suguridad (DAS), which is comparable to the FBI in the United 
States. They were accused of using electronic surveillance on opposition political 
parties. Over thirty agents and high-ranking officials were dismissed and are 
currently being prosecuted (Comfirma-DAS, 2009). While no ties have been 
directly attributed to President Uribe, this issue has called into question whether 
or not political forces are trying to close the political environment to open 
competition. President Uribe’s actions after this event have also been called into 
question because the judicial branch of the government has claimed that the 
President’s office has obstructed the investigation, as well as testimony by 
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demobilized AUC members’ against political allies of Uribe (Colombian Politics, 
2008). An additional challenge to the openness of Colombia’s political system 
would have to also include Uribe’s party sponsoring a law that would exclude the 
Judiciaries’ ability to investigate and try elected officials. In late August 2008, the 
government proposed to Congress a series of judicial reforms that would end a 
Supreme Court investigation and prosecution of public officials accused in the 
para-political scandal. Uribe’s supporters eventually withdrew this legislation, but 
the challenge to the judiciary was clear (Institutional Crisis, 2009).  
The most recent possible challenge to the openness of Colombian 
democracy, as the Wall Street Journal paraphrased in the Colombian 
newsweekly Semana in its opposition to a third proposed presidential term, “Its 
main argument was that the checks and balances in the constitution are 
designed for a four-year presidential term and that an erosion of the separation of 
powers under Mr. Uribe would be aggravated by a third term”(Cordoba, 2008). 
But, to be fair, President Uribe seems to be troubled by the decision. To date, he 
has not publicly declared intentions to run for a third time. 
While Uribe’s coalition of political parties has proven that the traditional 
liberal and conservative parties can be successfully challenged at the national 
level, the positive effects and successes of other parties should not be 
discounted. The leading opposition parties include the Polo Democratico 
Alternativo (PDA) and Partido de Cambio Radical (PCR), along with a large 
number of minor parties that often champion specific causes such as indigenous 
people’s rights, religious ideas, and environmental concerns. But, 2002 
legislation has limited the growth of new political parties by requiring them to 
receive at least two percent of national support to be officially recognized 
(Moreno, 2004).  
The Polo Democratico Alternativo’s success at all levels of the 
government has provided a much-needed voice to the left. These left parties 
have also demonstrated an aptitude for forming coalitions; the Polo Democratico 
Alternativo is actually a coalition of two parties, the Independent Democratic Pole 
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and the Democratic Alternative. In 2006, the PDA candidate for president won 22 
percent of the vote and 10 of the 100 senators seats (Registraduria Nacional del 
Estado Civil, 2006). The FARC and the ELN have not been willing or able to 
promote any party, still claiming that they have learned their lesson from the 
government and AUC violence against the Union Patriotica (UP). This 
disengagement from the political process has alienated most left leaning parties 
from any type of support for the FARC or ELN. The results of this disengagement 
have seemed also to further delegitimize the FARC and ELN, often equating to a 
belief that the FARC and ELN have limited, if any, positive ideological value to 
add to the process of the Colombian political system. This limited ideological 
contribution of the FARC, as stated by James F. Rochland, in Vanguard 
Revolutionaries in Latin America, is that, “...the FARC has transformed into a 
formidable criminal-military machine with a feeble ideological basis, and with little 
political legitimacy or credibility” (Rochlin, 2003). 
The diversity of Colombia’s political landscape has opened many new 
possibilities for the country’s future success. The opportunity for groups to 
organize and have their voices expressed through political means seems to be 
one of most promising developments that could contribute to ending the 
protracted conflict in Colombia, where violence has become an expectable 
expression of political desires. The government must ensure that while they 
attempt to regain security and obtain a governmental monopoly on violence, they 
do not in the process close political avenues of expression and force groups to 
revert to violence. The continued U.S. support for strengthening institutional 
checks and balances in the legislative and judicial branches may help alleviate 
future problems. But, the strength of these institutions and a free press may have 
already been proven by bringing scandals to light and forcing political changes.  
C. DEMOBILIZATION 
In 2002, the majority of the Auto Defensas de Colombia agreed to a 
unilateral cease-fire with the government of Colombia to conduct negotiations for 
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their demobilization. The resulting agreement was a monumental step forward for 
President Uribe’s DSDP and for Colombia as a whole. Clearly, this agreement 
was flawed at a number of levels, possibly with even less then admirable 
intentions, but the precedent it set has allowed for refinement and improvement 
of the process of demobilization. More importantly, it showed that the 
government’s hard line strategy could work. The current government’s 
demobilization efforts should be examined in three different phases. Phase One 
being the original agreement to demobilize the AUC in 2002 and 2003. Phase 
Two the refinement of the demobilization of AUC members under the Justicia y 
Paz legislation of 2005. The third phase is a newly developing phase where the 
FARC have increasingly been allowed to and are seeking out personal 
demobilization under the Justice and Peace legislation. 
Before examining each of the proposed phases, it is necessary to place 
these events in an historical environmental perspective in which these decisions 
were made. First, the Cesar Gaviria government agreed to lenient terms with the 
M-19 and other guerilla groups not because the guerillas were principled freedom 
fighters (Navarro, 2006). Rather, it was an opportunity to settle the problems with 
one of many threats during a period when Colombia was seriously close to 
becoming a failed state. With the government’s “back against the wall” they 
agreed to terms that were accommodating to the point of little to no jail sentences 
for men who had killed or ordered the killings of innocent Colombians (Navarro, 
2006). The government even went so far as to accept the guerillas’ demand for 
constitutional changes. These decisions surely infuriated some individuals 
because the guerillas had violated their human rights. However, the overall 
improvement in the security situation for the government and the people as a 
whole can be seen as a success. The contribution that these guerillas made to 
the government, after the process, should also be recognized.  
From 1991 until 2002, the government’s ability to influence its opponents 
did not change significantly in terms of growth of national power. With the 1991 
peace deal precedent set, and the government’s inability to force groups into 
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demobilization, it became apparent that the illegally armed groups would not be 
willing to accept harsh terms for demobilization. This suggested that the 
demobilization would have to be initiated at the behest of the illegally armed 
groups. The reason for a desired demobilization could be attributed to many 
factors, but one that seems relevant because of the protracted nature of the 
conflict in Colombia is simply that the combatants had become war weary. If 
fatigue of war was indeed one of the main motivations for demobilization, the 
government’s position could not have been very aggressive because the 
guerillas would simply have returned to the fight. 
With this historical and logical framework in mind, it is no surprise that the 
negotiations between the government and the AUC seemed to have a decidedly 
advantageous slant towards the AUC. Human rights groups and much of the 
international community vehemently opposed this negotiated agreement. The 
OAS commission on human rights states, ”...that those who been have involved 
in the commission of constituent conduct of atrocious acts of barbarism, 
terrorism, kidnapping, genocide and homicide , or the inhibiting resolution by the 
fact to participate in a demobilization process will not be able to benefit….the 
members of the AUC accused or condemned by the commission of violations of 
human rights cannot benefit from the mechanisms of extinction of the effective 
legal plan established within the framework for individual and collective 
demobilizations” (Translation by the author) (OAS, 2004). However, it also has to 
be questioned whether these groups are ignoring the historical realities in 
Colombia. Are they taking into account the possible benefits to future human 
rights with a demobilized AUC, or do they have a tendency to agree with left-wing 
guerillas and disagree with right-wing illegally organized groups? The most 
relevant critique provided by NGO and human rights organizations was not that 
these individuals be held accountable, but that this agreement did little to destroy 
of the organization of the AUC. This flaw has been proven true through the 
resurgence of former AUC members who never agreed to demobilize, and are 
now being called the “Agulas Negras.” However, the Colombian government has 
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seemed to be aggressively treating these groups as criminals. As an exchange 
officer in Colombia, the unit of one of the author’s successfully mounted 
numerous operations that targeted “Agulas Negras.”.  
In 2005, the Colombian Congress took a strong step to rectify some of the 
problems with the negotiated settlement of 2003. The law of Justice and Peace 
required full disclosure of all acts and if the demobilized individual was found to 
have not complied they would be prosecuted (Congreso De Colombia, 2003). 
This legislation, however, seems to have done little to break the organizational 
structure and ties of the demobilized AUC members. Yet, the one government 
strategy that seems to show progress is the further development of programs to 
reintegrate demobilized AUC members. The government’s initial program, “Back 
in 2002, when the government first tried to socialize hardened fighters, its 
approach was to issue monthly checks to meet subsistence costs and, in 
essence, wish the participants “buena suerte” (good luck) in reentering a world 
they were ill-equipped to cope with”(Krual, 2009, p. 23). However, in 2005 and 
2006, pilot programs in Medellin showed a much lower rate of criminal recidivism. 
This program became a national program in late 2006 in which the demobilized 
illegal group members receive financial support, vocational training, and 
counseling. They are required to attend these programs on a regular basis 
tracked through use of magnetic identifications cards. But, like all well-designed 
programs, if they are not properly funded and resourced with skilled 
professionals, their success will be dramatically reduced. Until now, a number of 
issues have been raised about the funding and staffing of these plans 
(Morgenstein, J., 2008). 
While these programs were originally intended for the demobilization of 
the AUC, the effectiveness and the positive benefits of the program were soon 
recognized by the FARC and Colombian security forces alike. This program was 
originally used on an informal basis for individuals that surrendered to security 
forces, but it soon was institutionalized and promoted by the government in an 
aggressive campaign to demobilize FARC and ELN soldiers. The government’s 
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extensive media campaign touting this opportunity to demobilize has clearly 
been, “Last year, 2,940 FARC fighters deserted. By the end of April of this year, 
there had been 544 desertions” (Brodzinsky, 2009). While these programs may 
never provide a solution to the problem of the FARC, it seems to have greatly 
diminished the FARC’s capability to sustain large numbers of insurgents and the 
FARC have been forced to recruit younger members. 
With a realistic appreciation for the historical environment in terms of each 
actor’s comparative strength, it seems clear that the demobilization process was 
necessary; even if the results seemed initially to favor individual perpetrators of 
human rights violations. The refinement of this process as the government’s 
relative strength grew did not exactly keep pace with this change in strength, but 
it did show a more favorable outcome for the government and the Columbian 
population. The Colombian government’s further increases in relative strength 
should continue to show more harsh results for the perpetrators of human rights 
violations. But, punishment should not become so punitive that it closes the door 
on a strategy that could result in lower numbers of illegally armed fighters, and in 
turn lower the probability of violations of human rights in the future. This is not to 
say that when collusion to protect these illegally armed groups can be proven 
that they should not be prosecuted, but this reintegration strategy seems to offer 
a peaceful mechanism to strengthen the government’s position and weaken the 
position of illegally armed groups. 
D. SECURITY FORCES (TWO STEPS FORWARD AND ONE STEP BACK) 
The Colombian National Police (CNP) has undergone an extremely 
dramatic transformation since the late 1980s. Many of the first initiatives that 
began this transformation have to be credited to both the Pastrana government 
and an internal movement for professionalization and adaption of a new strategic 
mindset. The National Police had decided that they must not become the military 
and must not adopt purely military approaches when developing and 
implementing plans. The police organization is to focus on criminal behavior and 
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not on warfare. This encouraged the police to reorganize in a number of different 
ways that encouraged more civilian interaction and participation. Only the units 
that were to be organized under the special operations command would focus on 
paramilitary tactics and strategies. One of the author’s personal experiences with 
the CNP has proven that, in general, this different mindset is institutionalized into 
the National Police’s personnel on a whole. Generally, the police do not consider 
the FARC or any other illegal armed group so much as the enemy but rather as a 
problem of delinquency. This institutionalized thought promotes plans and tactics 
that are often far from military equivalents. That is not to say that they do not 
observe certain military tenets such as security and fire power, but they often 
look for indirect ways of confronting problems.  
In recent years, the capacity of the police has continued to be further 
developed. According to the Global Security website(2009), the number of CNP 
personnel numbered around 55,000 in 1989 (National Police, 2009); however, 
according to Anne W. Patterson’s testimony to the U.S. Senate, CNP numbers 
increased to 97,000 in 2002, to 134,000 in 2007, and under new plans the 
number will increase by 20,000 by 2013(Patterson, 2007). The police have also 
received large amounts of funding for equipment and training through “Plan 
Colombia.” This assistance has been provided through the national anti-narcotics 
section (NAS) in the American Embassy as well as a number of justice 
department and DOD assistance efforts. The increase in force size has also 
translated into further state presence throughout the country, “We have helped 
fund the establishment of police units in 158 new municipalities, many of which 
had not seen any government presence in decades. Today, for the first time in 
the country’s history, all 1,099 of Colombia’s municipalities, equivalent to county 
seats, have a permanent government presence, an important step forward for the 
people of Colombia. To enhance the rule of law, USAID projects have assisted 
the Government of Colombia in establishing 45 Justice Houses, which provide 
access to justice and social services for poor Colombians” (Patterson, 2007).  
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The Colombian government’s efforts to professionalize its police force 
have also been extensive in that they have sought assistance and cooperation 
from many other international partners to increase their capacity. The 
government of Colombia has also sought to discourage corruption inside of the 
force by providing relatively good salaries to the CNP, and developing internal 
measures to check for fraud. Of the 100,000 police, 6,500 were removed under 
suspicion of corruption during the 1990s (Darling, 2000).  
The CNP’s increased capacity has provided the country with a level of 
security that Colombia has not seen for decades. Police have secured most 
major routes and overland travel has once again become common for ordinary 
citizens. According to the Colombian government, public opinion polls have had, 
“a similar rise in public approval for the National Police in the past 10 years. In 
1993, 21 percent of Colombians trusted the police. Now this figure has risen to 
59.7 percent” (Surprising Colombia, 2009). Overall, violent crime statistics are 
down dramatically. The CNP has also been seen as particularly competent at 
developing human intelligence. Many of its high profile police actions to capture 
paramilitaries, drug traffickers, ELN and FARC guerrillas have been extensively 
reported on. Some of the most notable operations include participation in the 
operations such as the freeing of Colombian and American hostages in July 
2008, the operation that killed Raul Reyes (Number 2 in the FARC), and the 
capture of numerous other mid level FARC leaders (Betancourt freed, 2008).  
However serious allegations have been leveled against the CNP which 
diminish the value of much of its progress. The most serious allegations have 
been directed at the CNP and the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad 
(DAS) two separate investigative agencies: 
Initial reports suggest that CNP agents have been monitoring email 
correspondence and telephone calls of opposition leaders, 
Supreme Court judges, journalists and members of the 
government…Intelligence officials are accused of selling 
intercepted information to a range of illegal actors, including drug 
traffickers, paramilitary groups and left-wing guerrillas. The DAS 
has been implicated in several scandals under President Alvaro 
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Uribe's administration, revealing senior intelligence officials' 
involvement with narcotics traffickers, extra-judicial killings and illicit 
surveillance. (Wiretapping, 2009) 
These accusations have been proven true in many cases. However, both 
the police and government have taken strong steps to punish the guilty and 
reform processes that should protect the people of Colombia from further police 
corruption. The head of CNP was forced to retire and is currently under 
investigation by the judiciary. This is not to say that the CNP will not continue to 
be vulnerable to corruption, but all police organization face this challenge and the 
measure of a strong police organization should be that it can identify this problem 
and take swift action to correct it. The CNP’s staggering growth rate should be 
taken into account when evaluating these scandals. The growth has been 
essential for securing ungoverned spaces in Colombia, but not surprising, the 
organizational processes have not kept pace with a force that has more than 
doubled in size. Efforts like Microsoft’s teaming with the CNP to create Web 
based organizational efficiencies and interaction with the community show 
promise for the future of the transition of the CNP (“Digital Police”, 2009), along 
with extensive use of Facebook and YouTube by the CNP.  
The growth of the military has also has been similar to that of the CNP. In 
2001, the military forces numbered 181,000 and under the Uribe administration 
have grown to 251,000, with planned growth of an additional 16,000 by 
2013(Patterson, 2007). The military has also received large portions of the 
resources provided under “Plan Colombia,” but more importantly the Colombian 
government has spent nearly seven billion dollars on the military from 2000–2005 
(Patterson, 2007) with an additional four billion dollar upgrade in military 
hardware planned for the next ten years in an agreement between Colombia, the 
United States, France, and Israel (Wells, 2009). The Colombian money has been 
raised by the Uribe administrations’ two separate wealth taxes.  
The professionalization and capacity development of the Colombian 
Military in terms of training and organizational growth has also been impressive. 
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The assistance training and educational assistance provided under “Plan 
Colombia” has been instrumental in the professionalization of a military that even 
critics admit has been substantial. The Colombian public has also recognized this 
increased professionalization, “While in 1993, public approval of the Armed 
Forces was 49 percent, but 12 years later it reached 79 percent.” (Suprising 
Colombia, 2009), and has probably even increased due to last year’s successful 
operations. The most prominent of these operations were Operation Jaque 
(hostage rescue of Ingrid Bentoncourt, four Americans, and twelve other 
Colombians), and the killing or capture of a number of high ranking FARC 
members. Extortion, homicide, and kidnappings have been greatly reduced to 
levels that seem to correlate with the military and police growth and their 
expansion throughout the country. 
The development of civil affairs and psychological operations units, along 
with implementation of community development programs by the military, have 
demonstrated that at least some elements in the military recognize that counter- 
insurgency cannot be won through force alone. The military has had a tradition of 
basing promotions on results and the traditional metric of measurement for the 
military was the number of enemy killed. The government and military have 
officially stated that this metric would not be used, but it is one author’s 
contention, through interaction with the Colombian military, that a prevailing 
cultural belief persists that still relies on a body count. Evidence of human rights 
violations due to extrajudicial killings has been presented by Human Rights 
groups and the U.N., and last year: 
The Colombian military recently announced that an internal 
investigation revealed that several army units were responsible for 
murdering civilians to inflate the body count of dead 
guerrillas…Continuing investigations in the Department of Defense 
and Prosecutor General's office will likely reveal that these deaths 
were not isolated incidents nor limited to the army. Over 100 claims 
of civilian deaths at the hands of security forces have emerged in 
recent weeks from nine areas in Colombia. (Penhaul, 2008) 
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Development of a new metric for success is crucial if the Colombian 
military is to avoid a repeat of these damaging actions. It is not sufficient to say 
that a body count is not a metric of success, because without a clearly defined 
metric, some members of the military will revert to this simple although 
inaccurate metric. The new metric should not be used to discourage aggressive 
military action; rather, to reward actions that result in strengthening public 
support. 
The quantitative and qualitative growth of the security forces in Colombia 
have clearly enabled much of Colombia’s development and worsened the 
prospects of success of the country’s illegally armed groups. However, with this 
growth these government forces have struggled to reform organizationally and 
culturally to fully utilize their increased capacity. This has often also resulted in 
human rights violations that have degraded their ability to win the support of the 
populace and maintain a monopoly on force within Colombia. It is unrealistic to 
say that the security forces will ever be free from corruption and abuse, but it is 
important to note that many of these faults have been identified within the 
Colombian government and security forces. Their actions of identification and 
correction seem to point to a healthy system that has many of the checks and 
balances essential to a security apparatus. 
E. FARC (TWO STEPS BACK AND ONE STEP TO THE SIDE) 
FARC losses have been reported across many different fronts. According 
to the EUI (2008) view wire,”… the FARC's financial position is debilitated, with 
its income estimated to have fallen by 40 percent. Although the guerrillas are 
actively involved in the illicit drug trade, the bulk of the profits remains with 
dealers in transit countries like Mexico. Revenue from kidnapping and extortion 
has declined, reflecting improved policing and military control by the 
government…The FARC's loss of territorial control as measured by the number 
of attacks against the Colombian armed forces is down by 40 percent. The ability 
of the guerrillas to communicate internally is being hindered by improved army 
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intelligence and surveillance. FARC morale is low and this will accelerate the 
pace of desertions and could result in some of it fronts seeking to start regional 
peace talks with the government” (Colombia Politics, 2008). Another report from 
Sibylla Brodzinsky (2009) states that the losses in personnel have also been 
staggering during the Uribe years, “From a peak of an estimated 18,000 fighters 
in 2002, the FARC now is believed to have only 9,000….The ranks have 
diminished through combat casualties, captures, and desertions. As a 
government strategy, encouraging desertions by offering leniency, protection, 
and vocational training has been at least as effective as military offensives 
against the FARC. Last year, 2,940 FARC fighters deserted” (Sibylla Brodzinsky, 
2009). The reports from the Colombian and U.S. governments, along with many 
independent organizations, show similar findings. These reports have also 
suggested that because of its losses the FARC has had to move into primarily 
defensive strategies with offensive operations limited to low exposure types of 
attacks like using IED and snipers.  
Losses in personnel, income, territorial control, politically valuable 
hostages, and public support have dealt significant blows to a guerrilla 
organization that was on the verge of entering into the war of movement phase of 
insurgency. However, the question remains to be answered if the FARC can 
survive these losses. The FARC have demonstrated that the group possesses an 
organizational structure and ability to change tactics according to its environment 
and which historically has been sufficient for its survival. But this time, the 
aforementioned improvement in the political system, government, and security 
forces seem to be permanent and allows little chance for the FARC to ever return 
to its apex.  
The FARC have demonstrated that they have the organizational 
capabilities to replace key leaders. Last year, Alfonzo Cano was named as the 
new head of the FARC because Manuel Mirlanda had died of a heart 
attack(Farah, 2008). There is also growing evidence that the FARC has changed 
strategies, and that it has reinforced efforts in different areas of the country such 
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as the Nariño and Chocó to focus on income protection of drug production 
(Romero, 2008). The FARC’s migration to border areas in Venezuela, Peru, 
Ecuador, Brazil, and Panama has been well documented. This strategy is 
particularly troubling because of reports that claim some countries (Venezuela) 
are not resisting their presence and are possibly unofficially sanctioning their 
actions (Cordoba, 2008). These tactics may indeed allow the FARC to survive, 
but the possibility of resurgence seems limited because the FARC will not be 
able to attain popular support when they are not among the population. 
Resurgence also seems unlikely in terms of support from a small number of 
farmers in isolated provinces, because the demographics of Colombia have 
become much more urban than in the 1960s when a rural movement would have 
been more profitable..  
Sibylla Brodzinsky (2009) of the Christian Science Monitor recently 
reported that in Colombia, The FARC Rebels Strike Back, “But with a new leader 
and leaner ranks, the FARC seems to be retaking the offensive. In early May, the 
FARC attacked government forces from a variety of different areas of the 
country, killing at least two dozen soldiers and police officers. In a single day, in 
fact, the FARC launched attacks in at least four areas, killing six servicemen. 
Since the start of the year, government forces have clashed with rebels 488 
times” (Brodzinsky, 2009). Based on discussions with both U.S. and Colombian 
military officers, this type of reporting may be very misleading. They claim that 
they have not seen any evidence of a broad new offensive and that the majority 
of these contacts occurred because the government forces initiated them. Their 
belief is that the FARC has reverted to defensive tactics. These types of reports 
on offensive resurgence of the FARC should be viewed skeptically because, as 
Peruvian history suggests, there may be some groups that will utilize the fear of 
the FARC for self-serving reasons. This is not to say that the FARC has fallen 
apart like the Shining Path and are not a major threat. Rather, the FARC are 
dangerous but over inflation of their capabilities can lead to ineffective strategies 
that run the risk of alienating the populace.  
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F. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
The importance of an economic boom during the Uribe years cannot be 
underestimated in its effects on the growth of the government’s capacity and the 
deteriorating situation of the FARC. President Uribe's neoliberal approach to 
economic development through privatization of the petroleum industry and his 
aggressive policy to enter into free trade agreements seems to have helped fuel 
this boom (Country Briefing, 2008). According to CRS-11 Plan Colombia: A 
Progress Report, “Colombia had the best performing stock market in the world in 
2004” (Beittel and Ribando, 2005). The GDP growth in 2006 was 7.0 percent and 
in 2007 was 8.4 percent (Country Briefing, 2008). The Colombian government 
has had to adjust for lower numbers due to the world’s economic downturn. This 
downturn will curtail the government’s capability to generate revenue. However, 
the timing of the earlier economic boom clearly assisted the government in 
growing its capacity. If the Colombian government is able to maintain these 
capacities it will continue to be effective against the illegally armed groups. It 
remains to be seen, however, if this boom has been translated into growth of the 
middle class and the lessening of poverty in rural areas. Should this be the case, 
it will surely curtail the recruitment of illegally armed groups like the FARC. The 
Colombian and international strategies of development assistance to these rural 
areas seem to be very promising in that their effects appear to be long lasting. 
National unity amongst the populace, according to James F. Rochelin, has 
been non-existent and has contributed to many of the country’s problems due to, 
“…Colombia’s ambience as a collection of warring city-states rather than a 
nation-state with a common identity” (Rochlin, 2003, p. 261). However, recent 
events have shown that an almost universal rejection of the FARC may provide 
an issue that inspires more unity and the common identity of a nation-state. The 
February 2008, civilian (organized through Face book), protests against the 
FARC were extraordinary to say the least. Citizens in every major city and many 
of the smaller cities in Colombia organized massive protests. Protests were also 
organized in many major cities around the world. These protests were focused 
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on two major ideas, first that the FARC should release the hostages, and second 
that the FARC should disband. While this was a onetime event it seemed to 
epitomize the Colombian rejection of the FARC because according to the Colombian 
government,” Opinion polls consistently indicate that popular support for does not 
exceed for FARC group 6 percent and for ELN group 5 percent” (Surprising 
Colombia, 2006). Polls that are more recent show around 2 percent to 4 percent 
approval ratings for the FARC. Clearly, these numbers probably underrepresented 
the opinions of isolated rural area populations, but with the change in demographics 
in Colombia to a more urbanized population, the relevance that the rural 
population has on the unity of the nation-state of Colombia has changed.  
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter intentionally omitted the FARC and Colombian government’s 
efforts in terms of illicit drugs, because there has been little change on this front. 
As long as the demand continues at such high levels it seems unlikely that any 
strategy will ever lower the importance of this economy in Colombia. This is not to 
say that the Colombian and U.S. strategies to fight drugs are not valuable, but their 
value is that they provide a way to limit the revenues of an insurgency: counter drug 
operations enable the primary mission of weakening the insurgency, but do not 
necessarily lead to curbing the illegal drug trade. We may indeed be writing the 
eulogy of the FARC. However, without further efforts to refine successes and curb 
failures by the government, Colombian society, and the international community 
along with the omnipresent force of the drug economy in Colombia may give rise to 
another dangerous group that can threaten democracy, freedom, and human rights 
in Colombia. Continued efforts to maintain the improved political system in 
Colombia should remain a priority. This shift has clearly created an outlet for 
disagreements that has carried Colombian society beyond the cycle of violence. 
The demobilization process also seems to offer an effective strategy that requires 
concessions by both sides. The security forces should obviously retain their 
operational capacity, but they should transition to a supporting role in many 
cases, and the emphasis should be on solving security issues through indirect, 
non-violent means. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The authors of this thesis spent a lot of time debating exactly what lessons 
and policy recommendations could be drawn from an historical evaluation of the 
FARC and its interactions with the Colombian State. During this debate, it was 
clear that a condensation and reiteration of the analysis was necessary to 
highlight the point that the FARC’s origins, growth, and ultimate decline have all 
been heavily influenced by policies of the Colombian government. The FARC in 
the past and in the future will be able to take actions that will affect their own 
fortunes, primarily because of organizational maturity and resource 
independence. However, it is clear that ultimately the biggest factors that will 
influence the future of the FARC are the policies that implemented by the 
Colombian State and its strongest allies the United States.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The origins, growth, and ultimate decline of the FARC detailed in this 
thesis will be condensed and reiterated here. This reiteration of the key historical 
events and trends seems to demonstrate that the future of the FARC is primarily 
in the hands of the Colombian government and subject to the policies they 
pursue. The government’s lack of synchronization of efforts has been the most 
debilitating aspect of Colombia’s attempts to combat the conflict that has 
terrorized Colombia for the time period we have studied. The FARC rose to level 
of power that few guerilla organizations have ever attained without toppling a 
government. However, its meteoric rise was only possible because of the 
government’s incoherent strategies or lack of strategy. During the early years of 
the FARC, the government conducted little to combat the insurgency problem, 
and clearly the government’s particular political system gave the FARC a 
legitimate basis for mobilization. However, the FARC remained a very limited 
threat to Colombia because it had a small resource base and little external 
support.  
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During the early 1980s, the FARC were able to capitalize on the growth of 
the illicit drug market in Colombia. Their capitalization on this growing market 
was initially very well suited to allow them to remain an ideological group 
because it was able to tax without the stigma of traditional drug organizations. 
The government of Colombia, during the 1980s, attempted to negotiate with the 
FARC. But, the FARC’s new found economic strength and organizational 
structure obtained through 30 years of existence would make peace negotiations 
impractical. That is to say, the government of Colombia had new “carrots” of 
value to offer an organized and well funded FARC. The government of Colombia 
had even newer “sticks” to threaten with. As Julia Sweig (2002) argues, the 
reason for the lack of sticks was, “…no accident that Colombia lacks a state 
apparatus or effective institutions outside its principal cities. Neglecting such 
development was a conscious decision by the country’s ruling class, which 
realized long ago that limiting the reach of the army and the police was the best 
way to guarantee that the elite could exploit the country’s riches” (Sweig, 2002). 
The government’s impotency led to years of protracted negotiations in which the 
FARC increased capabilities to secure resources and mobilize followers. The 
government of Colombia was presented with an opportunity to legitimize the 
FARC, by moving them into the political sphere and out of the shadows of 
insurgency, with the formation of the Union Patriaticio. However, again, an 
unsynchronized and ineffective government was not able to protect the U.P. 
Indeed parts of the segmented government even targeted the U.P. with the 
consequence of encouraging the groups to strengthen their militaristic approach.  
The Betancourth and Gaviria administration’s efforts to negotiate peace 
were clear evidence that the government of Colombia did not and would never 
have the carrots needed to induce the FARC to accept a peacefully negotiated 
settlement to the conflict. This peace process went so far as to rewrite the 
constitution drawing other organizations, like the M-19, into the agreement. The 
ideologically driven M-19 clearly had a capable organization comparable to the 
FARC in terms of organization, but it lacked the resources and independence 
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that the FARC had due to its illicit drug connection. Therefore, it seems that the 
FARC’s independence and resources precluded or severely limited the group’s 
motivation to come to a negotiated settlement. The lack of synchronization on the 
part of the Colombian government was exemplified under the Samper 
administration, and which was further compounded by U.S. policies towards 
drugs and Colombia. The FARC were able to take advantage of this situation by 
aggressively becoming more involved in the illicit drug market as the cartels were 
“taken down”. With the fall of communism in Europe, the FARC was confronted 
with other challenges. The FARC’s new Bolivarian ideology quickly revealed 
weaknesses. The new ideology was centered on the idea of alternative, more 
legitimate governance. However, during the years of the “despeje” the FARC had 
little success proving that they provided better governance to the people of the 
“despeje.” The FARC’s reliance on militaristic dominated strategies, financed 
through illicit drug money, almost completely delegitimized their social base other 
than in the coca cultivation areas. The Pastrana administration’s attempts to 
negotiate with an even stronger FARC, granting the FARC concessions that 
further strengthened the group’s position seemed counterproductive. However, 
this exhaustive and dangerous process may have been beneficial to Colombia in 
the long run because it had become more and more evident that the FARC would 
never negotiate from its position of strength. President Pastrana’s realization of 
the fact that the FARC would not accept concessions to make peace resulted in 
the development of Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia was a large step forward for 
the development of a synchronized Colombian plan to deal with the FARC. 
Plan Colombia, however, was not the “silver bullet” to all of Colombia’s 
problems. Clearly, the synchronization of efforts both of Colombia and U.S. was 
not always efficient, and at times the efforts were misdirected. The misdirection 
was often due to Colombian and U.S. perspectives that drugs were the root of 
the problem. Author Tom Marks provides a strong argument that, “Drugs, to 
repeat, are not the central element of Colombia’s problem. That is state 
fragmentation. We can talk of nothing until the government actually exercises its 
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writ within its national territory” (Marks, 2003). However, Plan Colombia did offer 
a level of synchronization of effort that had been missing during all other efforts.  
President Uribe’s election to office in itself also weakend the FARC’s 
original grievance because, he was able to win the highest office as an 
Independent. Success of parties such as the left-leaning Polo Democratica are 
also seen as evidence of an opening political system that further deteriorated the 
original ideological basis of the FARC. Under the Politica de Consolidacion de la 
Seguridad Democratica (PCSD), President Uribe was able to further refine 
synchronization of government efforts by focusing on security forces retaking 
control of national territory. The success of the Uribe administration was then 
deepened by efforts to demobilize the AUC, limiting the number and influence of 
advisories in the conflict. Plan Patriota further strengthened the security forces 
present in areas that were once controlled by the FARC. The government’s 
efforts were particularly successful in terms of killing, capturing, or inducing many 
of the individual FARC members to demobilize. However, the FARC still retained 
a strong organizational structure that has proved resilient to a decapitation 
campaign, and it is still well funded by its illicit activities. The FARC’s recruitment 
capabilities also give the FARC a powerful tool to demonstrate strength, but the 
FARC’s child recruitment policies do provide the government with an opportunity 
to capitalize on through aggressive Information Operations campaigns. The 
popular of appeal of the FARC has been reduced to extremely low levels, in part 
due to effective information operations of the government, frustration with FARC 
terrorist tactics, and a growing legitimate economy. These conditions have led 
the writers of this work to the conclusion that through a more complete 
understanding of the situation, policies can be developed to further refine 





The FARC have survived the test of time and along the way have 
developed an organizational capacity and strategies that will make complete 
destruction improbable. A negotiated peace settlement that is acceptable to the 
government of Colombia is also unlikely. However, history has also 
demonstrated that the FARC can be relegated to relative obscurity and to a 
position of limited threat capacity. Although the government of Colombia has 
enjoyed many successes over the last few years, without additional refinement of 
strategies and coordination of efforts, the FARC will continue to remain a 
legitimate threat to the government of Colombia. Democracy and bureaucratic 
aspects of government will always create inefficiencies, but do not preclude the 
government from setting out a strategy that is very synchronized and effective at 
reducing the threat of the FARC. This strategy may not be perfectly adhered to, 
but if endorsed at the highest levels, any deviation would be vulnerable to public 
scrutiny. Therefore, it is recommended that the first step in any efforts must be 
the development and dissemination of a single plan across a wide number of 
government offices and agencies. It is clear that bureaucratic competition 
between different agencies can be limiting, but with effective incentives and 
acceptance of a single public strategy, these problems may be limited.  
The constraints placed on the government because of resource limitations 
have led to a development of a plan that focuses on four issues for the 
government in the immediate term and four secondary issues; however, the 
secondary issues should be simultaneously, even if at reduced levels. With time 
and reevaluation of conditions, it is believed that the focus of efforts then should 
shift to the final four aspects based on the threat of the FARC.  
The primary focus should be on the synchronization of efforts in the areas 
of police, justice system, military, and rural economic development. The 
secondary efforts are to be in the area of Information Operations, demobilization 
programs, attention to displaced persons, and overall economic development.  
 62
The National Police of Colombia are particularly crucial to the success of 
this multi-phase strategy. All other efforts will only succeed if the police can 
provide the depth of the government writ of control through the geographically 
diverse and dispersed population of the State of Colombia, down to the level of 
the individual citizen. Therefore, it is recommended that while the National Police 
organization is already considerable in numbers, it should be increased to a 
military company-sized police force that operates in the all medium-sized towns 
and platoon-sized forces in all small towns. Large cities appear to have sufficient 
police presence. One possible recommendation to help increase the size of the 
police force is to develop a program where military personnel, in particular 
professional soldiers, can be retrained to serve in this police force. Another, 
proposal for the recruitment of quality police officers is the development of a 
program similar to the G.I. Bill program where, after a certain number of 
honorable years of service with the police, the individual would be eligible for 
education or trade skills training. The incentive of retraining after honorable 
service could also be used to curb corruption and keep these individuals from 
using their skills in nefarious activities after leaving police service. 
The Microsoft’s efforts with the police to increase communication and 
coordination should be further emphasized and supported by both the Colombian 
and U.S. efforts. All other agencies, particularly the military, must also increase 
communication and coordination efforts.  
The military’s successful operations of clearing an area must be secured 
through a police presence that can retain order in that area. Military and police 
coordination is essential and support efforts must be reciprocal. Historically the 
military and police have not had a particularly complementary relationship 
because of bureaucratic competition. We, therefore, also encourage the 
administration to force joint operations and strategies by reorganizing many of 
the forces so that they will become accountable to the opposite organization, i.e., 
joint billets and staff, where individual officers will be rated by both military and  
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police. This strategy was effective at reducing organizational competition when 
Joint Task Force Omega was created and is likely to work if the police are also 
integrated.  
Finally, the police must make fighting the FARC’s ability to recruit a 
primary mission, especially when child soldiers are involved. The police must 
develop programs to control and eliminate forcible abduction of children to the 
FARC through a number of strategies. At a minimum, the police must provide a 
legitimate force that can be called upon at local levels. They must also develop 
other programs to confront other of the FARC’s recruitment strategies in 
communities. Curtailing FARC recruitment must be a metric of determining police 
success.  
The legal system of Colombia is said to be well developed in terms of the 
number and types of laws. The authors do not claim to be legal experts, but it is 
clear that the justice system is not fast, nor is it accessible to the whole 
population. We recommend that the Colombian government make great efforts to 
improve the speed and accessibility of this system to all of its citizens. The 
number of displaced person in Colombia provides a clear example of the judicial 
system’s failure to provide legal recourse to millions of Colombians. The U.S. 
efforts in areas like witness protection must be increased. The U.S. can also 
provide assistance when the Colombian Justice system requests assistance. The 
Justice system has proven to be fiercely independent and a reasonably effective 
check in the political system. However, we encourage that the justice system 
develop additional anti-corruption units to ensure that the military, the police, the 
political system, wealthy individuals, and illegally armed groups are held 
accountable when violating the law. U.S. extradition is appropriate when 
Colombia and U.S. interests align, but future U.S. investment in the 
modernization of Colombian prisons and prison staff training assistance may be 




priority of tax adherence. Without effective prosecution for tax evasion, the 
government will be deprived of resources that are essential to the overall reform 
effort.  
The Colombian military should be proud of its recent successes, but must 
be made very aware of its costly mistakes. Both the Colombian efforts and U.S. 
efforts still need to ensure that the military increases its mobility and lethality. 
Therefore, modernization of equipment will continue to be a key area of 
development. However, both the Colombian and U.S. governments should 
expend additional effort in the development of the military’s information 
operations capabilities so that the military has the tools to begin to focus on non-
kinetic operations. This focus must be driven from the top down within the 
Colombian government, not asking the military to become police, but 
encouraging free thinking regarding the metrics of success that are positive in 
this counter insurgency. The U.S. can assist by providing additional training 
assistance with P.O.I. that focuses on non kinetic operations. These types of 
training and assistance may assist the military in developing effective metrics of 
success that do not encourage human rights abuses. The military still should be 
the force of choice when combating the FARC on the battlefield because the 
FARC is still a legitimate military threat; however, as stated before, the military 
need to have better communication and coordination with the police to ensure 
that hard fought victories are not lost. The police should provide planners to all 
division brigade-sized operations and the military should provide an effective 
system of assistance for the police in the newly cleared areas.  
Finally, while it is not thought that the military need to be increased by 
significant numbers, the development of a G.I. Bill type of program for military 
service should be implemented. Again, if accompanied by appropriate incentives, 
this program could help curb corruption and disregard of human rights issues. 
This program would also keep well-trained personnel from using their skills in a 
criminal manner, because they will have legitimate skills for earning a living.. 
Because military service is mandatory unless it can be “paid out,” the new 
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training options may reduce some of the problems associated with mandatory 
military service and will likely help develop human capital in Colombia. 
Targeted economic development in rural areas, especially those recently 
cleared by the military and secured by the police is of great importance. This 
strategy of clear, hold, build is nothing new, but if the Colombian government and 
U.S. assistance can develop innovative synchronized small-scale economic 
development coupled with the return of police protection and an effective legal 
system, many of these communities may be able to free themselves from the 
FARC. No specific types of targeted economic development are recommended 
because each program should be tailored to the specific conditions of the area. 
However, it is recommend that the government work to build key infrastructure in 
these areas to include roads, water, and electricity. The efforts should also 
encourage tax relief for small and medium-sized businesses, along with grants 
and loans to small businesses to provide employment and services in these 
areas. The coordination of church and NGO efforts will also help legitimize and 
encourage the government’s strategies for development. 
The secondary areas of emphasis recommended are increasing 
coordination and effectiveness of all government agencies’ information 
operations, so that the government’s successful efforts are accentuated and the 
FARC’s and other illegally armed groups’ actions are available for public scrutiny. 
The demobilization programs that have had success should also be promoted, 
with consideration of what the NGO and church organizations can add to these 
programs. The government should be creative in approaches of employing 
demobilized personnel to support the government’s efforts across the spectrum 
of its efforts. An example of this would be police and military employing 
demobilized personnel to work in anti-recruitment efforts or information 
operations campaigns.  
Overall economic development is a primary goal of any country. This 
thesis puts this at the forefront primarily because the U.S. can prove its 
commitment to this strategy by implementing the free trade “deal” with Colombia. 
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Colombia itself must also continue its coordinated economic development efforts, 
so that economic development can benefit the rural areas in particular, always 
attempting to destroy the base of the FARC’s threat.  
Finally, the displaced people of Colombia are of great concern, not only in 
human terms, but also because it is clear they are vulnerable to coercion from 
illegally armed groups. Improved police services and an efficient legal system will 
clearly provide the most effective and long lasting counter measures to this 
problem. However, the scale of this situation does require that the government 
take two additional measures. First, a government truth commission with church 
and NGO participation will help assist the country as a whole to acknowledge 
and deal with the problem. Second, the government may not be responsible for 
reparations for these individuals, but clearly in its clear, hold, and build strategy, it 
may be considered a matter of public good to provide land redistribution in these 
areas to displaced people.  
The thesis suggests that U.S. efforts should first be multilateral 
development of these strategies. It is our recommendation that the U.S. 
immediately stop the eradication efforts that have shown little success and have 
detracted from other successful strategies in Colombia. This money can be 
redistributed to assist in any of the other eight areas of recommendation, or to 
place more emphasis on the demand side of the problem in the United States. 
Finally, the U.S. efforts should also be well thought out to ensure that all 
assistance is given proper incentives for success. Clearly, these incentives can 
be created in a manner that encourages the respect of human rights and works 
against corruption. Done effectively further assistance can also encourage and 
deepen relations with one of the United States’ closest allies in this hemisphere.  
It is our contention that the FARC are indeed gone as an insurgent group 
that has legitimate capability to displace the Colombian government. In the short 
term, the intensity of its terrorist type actions against the population may even 
increase as the FARC struggles for survival and identity, but most likely these 
acts will just further alienate them from the population. Only the mismanagement 
 67
of the Colombian government and U.S. policies can provide the FARC with an 
opportunity for resurgence. Through effective governance and the smooth 
coordination and proper calibration of U.S. policy towards Colombia, we can 
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